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Sanctions Under Amended Federal Rule 11-Some
"Chilling" Problems in the Struggle Between
Compensation and Punishment*
MELISSA

L.

NELKEN**

Sanctions came into their own in the 1983 amendments to the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. Explicit authority to award money sanctions, against lawyers as well as their clients, was written into rules 11, 16, and 26, and sanctions
were made mandatory for violating rules 11 and 26. These changes were provoked by a decade of criticism of the spiraling costs, delay, and abuse that have
come to characterize the pretrial stage of litigation.' These problems are rooted
not only in the dynamics of the adversary system, but also in the apparent reluctance of judges to use the sanctions already at their disposal to curb abusive and
dilatory practices. 2
The 1983 amendments call for a significant shift in relations between court
and counsel in the litigation process.3 The federal judge is now required not only
to be an active case manager, but also to police lawyers who overuse, misuse, or
otherwise abuse the litigation process. 4 The new sanctions provisions emphasize
* Copyright @ 1986 by Melissa L. Nelken.
** Associate Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of the Law. B.A. 1965,

Brandeis University; M.A. 1966, Harvard University; J.D. 1974, University of Michigan. I want to thank
my colleagues David I. Levine and Mary Kay Kane for their extensive comments on earlier versions of
this article, and Trina GriUo and Ronald Lee for their editoral assistance. Special thanks are also due to

Beth Aboulafia, Hastings Class of 1987, for her tireless and meticulous research assistance.
1. See, eg., Rosenberg & King, Curbing Discovery Abuse in Civil Litigation: Enough is Enough, 1981
B.Y.U. L. REV. 579; Brazil, Views from the Front Lines. Observations by Chicago Lawyers About the
System of Civil Discovery, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 219 [hereinafter Brazil, Views]; C. ELLINGTON, A
STUDY OF SANCTIONS FOR DISCOVERY ABUSE (1979); Brazil, The Adversary Characterof Civil Discovery:
A Critique andProposalsfor Change, 31 VAND. L. REv. 1295 (1978) [hereinafter Brazil, Civil Discovery];
Kirkham, Complex Civil Litigation-Have Good Intentions Gone Awry?, 70 F.R.D. 199 (1976).
2. See, eg., Miller, The Adversary System: Dinosauror Phoenix?,69 MINN. L. REV. 1 (1984); Renfrew,
Discovery Sanctions: A Judicial Perspective, 2 REV. LITIGATION 71 (1981); R. RODES, K. RIPPLE & C.
MOONEY, SANCTIONS IMPOSABLE FOR VIOLATIONS OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
(1981); Note, The Emerging DeterrenceOrientationin the Imposition of Discovery Sanctions, 91 HARV. L.
REV. 1033 (1978); Comment, FinancialPenaltiesImposed Directly Against Counsel in Litigation Without
Resort to the Contempt Power, 26 UCLA L. REV. 855 (1979) [hereinafter Comment, FinancialPenalties];
Comment, SanctionsImposed by Courts on Attorneys Who Abuse the JudicialProcess,44 U. CHI. L. REV.
619, 620 (1977) [hereinafter Comment, Sanctions on Attorneys Who Abuse].
3. See Miller, supra note 2, at 34 (warning that increased judicial management "calls for a significant
change in the power relationship between judges and lawyers and in their respective functions").
4. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11, 16, 26 advisory committee's notes on 1983 amendments, reprinted in 97
F.R.D. 165, 213, 218 (1983) (amended rule 11 "intended to reduce the reluctance of courts to impose
sanctions"; new rule 16 sanctions intended to control "disobedient or reluctant parties [or] their attorneys"; rule 26 sanctions "designed to curb discovery abuse"); A. MILLER, THE AUGUST 1983 AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE: PROMOTING EFFECTIVE CASE MANAGEMENT
AND LAWYER RESPONSIBILITY (1984); Miller & Culp, Litigation Costs, Delay Prompted the New Rules of
Civil Procedure, Nat'l L.J., Nov. 28, 1983, at 24, col. 1 [hereinafter Miller & Culp, Litigation Costs]; Miller
& Culp, The New Rules of Civil Procedure:ManagingCases, Limiting Discovery, Nat'l L.J., Dec. 5, 1983,
at 23, col. 1 [hereinafter Miller & Culp, New Rules]. The case management literature is extensive. See
generally Resnick, ManagerialJudges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 376 (1982); Peckham, The FederalJudge as a
Case Manager: The New Role in Guiding a Case From Filing to Disposition, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 770
(1981); Brazil, ImprovingJudicial Controlsover the PretrialDevelopment of Civil Actions: Model Rules for
Case Management and Sanctions, 1981 Am. B. FOUND. RE. J. 873 (1981); Schwarzer, Managing Civil
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and give teeth to this policing function.
Rule 11, an antiquated and rarely invoked rule5 that governs all filings in federal court, was substantially redrafted in the 1983 amendments. It became the
centerpiece of the new role for sanctions as a powerful case management tool.
Rule 11 now requires a lawyer signing a paper filed in federal court to certify
that "after reasonable inquiry" the paper has an adequate legal and factual basis
and that it is not interposed for "any improper purpose."' 6 Under the rule, sanctions for violations are mandatory and bad faith no longer needs to be shown to
establish a violation. These two changes alone have greatly increased the
number of situations in which sanctions are considered. Between August 1,
1983, when the rule took effect, and August 1, 1985, judges in more than 200
reported cases considered rule 11 sanctions.
Rule 11 sanctions can be imposed on the lawyer, the client, or both. The
sanctions are viewed by some as primarily compensatory and by others as primarily punitive; the tension between these two views cannot be completely reconciled. On the one hand, sanctions are a form of cost-shifting, compensating a
party for expenses incurred because of an opponent's unnecessary, wasteful, or
abusive conduct. On the other hand, they are a form of punishment, imposed
only on those who violate the rule. Whatever the rationale for imposing sanctions, their frequent use is likely to be a significant deterrent. An emphasis on
punishment, however, heightens the rule's potential for deterring vigorous advocacy-a substantial and uncertain risk foreseen by the rule's drafters.
In this article, I will review briefly the history of rule 11 and the policy concerns that led to its amendment in 1983. I will then discuss the major changes in
the rule and survey its use during the first two years following its amendment. I
will explore the significance of the compensation-punishment dichotomy in the
analysis and implementation of the rule's sanctions provisions and examine how
courts have balanced the two objectives in specific cases. Finally, I will evaluate
the potential chilling effect of rule 11 sanctions, particularly as exemplified in the
punishment oriented interpretation of one the rule's major proponents, Judge
William W Schwarzer of the Northern District of California. In conclusion, I
will suggest that the purpose of the rule can best be served by nonmandatory
sanctions and an interpretation that views the rule in the context of the Federal
Rules' overall procedural scheme, and that seeks to minimize the rule's chilling
effect on vigorous advocacy.
I.

THE REASONS FOR CHANGE
A. THE FORMER RULE

Before its amendment in 1983, rule 11 had remained unchanged since its promulgation in 1938. It provided that, by signing a pleading, a lawyer certified
that there was "good ground to support [the pleading]" and that it was "not
Litigation: The TrialJudge's Role, 61 JUDICATURE 400 (1978); S. FLANDERS, CASE MANAGEMENT AND
COURT MANAGEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS (1977).
5. See Risinger, Honesty in PleadingandIts Enforcement: Some "Striking" Problems with FederalRule
of Civil Procedure11, 61 MINN. L. REv. 1 (1976), for a thorough and illuminating study of the history,
limitations, and use of former rule 11.
6. FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
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interposed for delay."'7 Historically, the signature requirement served the purpose of generating clients by insuring that bills in equity did not get filed without
assistance from counsel. The signature certified nothing concerning the grounds
for the bill.8 The "good ground" certification included in the former rule
stemmed from Justice Story's gloss on history, which read into the signature
requirement a guaranty by counsel that the pleading in question was wellfounded. 9 Story's view was incorporated into rule 24 of the Equity Rules of
1842 and, later, into the 1912 Equity Rules. 10
Equity Rule 24 was the source of the language used in rule 11 when it was
adopted as part of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 48 years ago.11 The
"good ground" standard had received no attention in the case law before that
time. 12 On its face, the standard required that every pleading have a sound factual and legal basis. Wright and Miller construed the rule also to impose a
"moral obligation" on the lawyer not to file baseless pleadings. 13 Similarly, Ris14
inger concluded that the rule was intended "to secure lawyer honesty."
The former rule focused on the lawyer's conduct, but its enforcement provisions were directed at the client. If a pleading was signed "with intent to defeat
the purpose" of the rule, it could be stricken as sham' 5-a sanction that harshly
penalized the client for the lawyer's misconduct. A "wilful" violation of the rule
might also lead to "appropriate disciplinary action" against the lawyer. Such
action has been rare even in recent years, because of the predominant interpreta16
tion that it could be taken only if the lawyer acted in subjective bad faith.
Described by one commentator as "the most famous and widely applicable
binding precept regulating lawyer honesty in pleading,"' 17 former rule 11 was
nonetheless rarely applied before its amendment in 1983.18 The former rule's
7. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (1980) (amended 1983).
8. Risinger, supra note 5, at 10-11.
9. [E]very Bill ...must have the signature of counsel annexed to it ....The great object of this
rule is, to secure regularity, relevancy, and decency in the allegations of the Bill, and the responsibility and guaranty of counsel, that upon the instructions given to them, and the case laid
before them, there is good grounds for the suit in the manner, in which it is framed.
J.STORY, EQUITY PLEADINGS ch. 11, § 47 (1838) (emphasis added) (quoted in Risinger, supra note 5, at
9-10).
10. Risinger, supra note 5, at 13.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 14.
13. 5 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1333, at 499 (1969).
14. Risinger, supra note 5, at 14.
15. Although the language of the rule was directed primarily at lawyer honesty, the provision for
striking as sham historically required both a determination of the dishonesty of the pleader and of the
falsity of the pleading. Risinger, supra note 5, at 16; see 5 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 13,
§ 1334, at 502 ("A motion to dismiss as sham under Rule 11 should not be granted if there is any possibility that the party can prove his case.").
16. See Buchanan v. Blase, No. 83-C-2932, slip op. at 5 (N.D. Ill. July 30, 1984) (prior to amendment,
rule 11 required "clear showing of subjective bad faith or intentional misconduct"); Badillo v. Central
Steel & Wire, 717 F.2d 1160, 1166 (7th Cir. 1983) (award of attorney's fees denied for lack of showing of
bad faith); Nemeroff v. Abelson, 620 F.2d 339, 350 (2d Cir. 1980) (per curiam) (attorneys' fees denied
where action "not without foundation and hence not commenced in bad faith").
17. Risinger, supra note 5, at 4-5.
18. Risinger found only 19 "genuine adversary Rule 11 motions," the first in 1950. Id. at 35. Wright,
Miller, and Kane cite close to 40 cases decided between 1975 and 1983 that deal with rule 11 issues other
than failure to sign pleadings. 5 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 13, §§ 1332-34 (1983 Supp.). For
an example of conduct that provoked sanctions under the former rule, see Kinee v. Abraham Lincoln Fed.
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"meaningless sanctions" and "soft standards" 19 have frequently been cited as
reasons for its relative invisibility and disuse. Renewed use of the rule in recent
years, however, suggests that it was less the rule's language than prevalent ideas
about the propriety of sanctions against lawyers that caused it to be ignored for
so long.
Whatever its limitations, former rule 11 did address a matter of considerable
concern to the drafters of the 1983 amendments: the responsibility of lawyers
not to file groundless or improperly motivated papers. It thus became a prime
candidate for amendment to20make it an effective deterrent to tactics that ignore
the social costs of litigation.
B. THE GROWING CONCERN WITH LITIGATION ABUSE

The 1983 amendments were adopted after more than a decade of mounting
concern about misuse and overuse of the litigation process, and an increasing
federal caseload. These concerns were expressed by Chief Justice Burger in his
1976 keynote address to the Pound Conference: "Correct or not, there is also a
widespread feeling that the legal profession and judges are overly tolerant of
lawyers who exploit the inherently contentious aspects
of the adversary system
'
to their own private advantage at public expense. "21
Much of the specific criticism of lawyers' behavior during this period focused
on discovery tactics that subvert the spirit, if not the letter, of the rules. 22 There
was also a more general concern that lack of effective judicial oversight and tactical considerations in litigation-manipulating the process to gain an advantage
for clients-had clogged the courts with frivolous suits and unnecessary pretrial
activity. The traditional sources of authority for sanctioning lawyers, 23 although
suitable for truly egregious cases, were limited to situations involving subjective
bad faith or intentional misconduct. Thus they could not reach much conduct
that was both counterproductive and costly to the system.
A case that illustrates the frustration caused by traditional limitations on sanctions is Buchanan v. Blase,24 which was decided after the 1983 amendments took
effect but involved pre-amendment conduct. The plaintiff, Buchanan, was a bartender who had been accused of serving liquor to a minor. He was fired after his
employer was warned by the liquor commissioner that she might lose her liquor
Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 365 F. Supp. 975, 982-83 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (plaintiffs' lawyers sanctioned for naming as
defendants all lenders listed under "mortgage brokers" in telephone book).
19. Miller & Culp, Litigation Costs, supra note 4, at 34 col. I.
20. Miller, supra note 2, at 17-19 ("the court system is a valuable societal resource, not merely the
private playpen of the litigants").
21. Address by Chief Justice Warren Burger,Agenda for 2000 A.D.-Need for Systematic Anticipation,
National Conference on the Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice (April 79, 1976) (conference commemorating Roscoe Pound's address to American Bar Association 1906 annual
meeting), reprintedin 70 F.R.D. 79, 91 (1976).
22. See generally Brazil, Views, supra note 1 (survey of 144 Chicago lawyers investigating their perceptions of tactical discovery abuses); Brazil, supra note 4 (large, complex litigation particularly fertile environment for discovery abuse; proposing modifications to discovery process); Brazil, Civil Discovery, supra
note 1 (adversary system and economics of law practice motivate contravention of discovery's purposes).
23. These include sanctions under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1982), contempt statutes, and the inherent powers
of the court. See generally Comment, Sanctions on Attorneys Who Abuse, supra note 2, at 619-29, 633-36
(discussing these sanctions and others).
24. No. 83-C-2932, slip op. (N.D. Ill. July 30, 1984).
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license if Buchanan remained on the payroll. The bartender sued the liquor
commissioner, claiming violation of his civil rights under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and
1985. The commissioner's lawyer wrote to the plaintiff's lawyers, who had
failed to appear at the initial hearing on the defendant's motion to dismiss, warning that he would seek attorney's fees if the suit was not dismissed voluntarily.
The plaintiff's lawyers replied (in the margin of the letter sent to them), "[We]
are all quaking in our boots." After the motion to dismiss was granted, one of
the plaintiff's lawyers denied that he had had any responsibility for handling the
case. Both of the plaintiff's lawyers defended against the motion for fees solely
on their own behalf, raising no argument that such an award against the plaintiff
himself was unwarranted under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. Although the court reproved
the lawyers for their "thoroughly unprofessional" conduct, "abjectly deficient
briefing," and repeated "bungling" of the case, it nonetheless concluded that
there was no basis for an award of sanctions against them under any of the
standards in effect in April, 1983, when the complaint was filed:
The standards for an award of costs and fees against a lawyer under
28 U.S.C. § 1927, Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 (prior to the 1983 amendment),
and the court's inherent power to punish bad faith conduct are closely
related and exceedingly stringent ....
[T]hese provisions therefore
lack utility in all but the most outrageous cases ....
They do not
punish mediocre lawyering or even the sort of gross blundering exhibited in this case .... Nor do they punish behavior that may only be
characterized as unprofessional and irresponsible. 2 5
C. THE

1983

AMENDMENTS

The 1983 amendments to rules 7, 11, 16, and 26 have been described as an
"integrated package" 26 designed to make lawyers more accountable for their actions, increase judicial management of cases, improve the discovery process, and
encourage use of sanctions where appropriate. 27 They focus on the pretrial process and attempt to remedy the perceived inefficiencies and abuses of the system
by increasing judicial oversight of litigation and by diminishing the incentives for
certain kinds of litigation behavior through sanctions provisions. Rule 7(b)(3)
makes explicit the application of rule 11 to motions as well as pleadings. 2 8 Rule
16, which expands the role of pretrial conferences, is a "blueprint for management,"2 9 and rule 26 puts the judge in the driver's seat with respect to the scope
of discovery. 30 Rule 11 is a general provision that supplements the case management tools prescribed in rules 16 and 26. It imposes a revised certification re25. Id. at 5-6.
26. A. MILLER, supra note 4, at 2.
27. Id. at 10-11.
28. "The addition of Rule 7(b)(3) makes explicit the applicability of the signing requirement and the
sanctions of Rule 11 .... 2 FED. R. Civ. P. 7 advisory committee's note to 1983 amendment.
29. A. MILLER, supra note 4, at 20.
30. "The amendment ...is designed to encourage district judges to identify instances of needless
discovery and to limit the use of the various discovery devices accordingly." FED. R. CIv. P. 26 advisory
committee's note to 1983 amendment.
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quirement on lawyers with respect to all filings; 3 1 and it explicitly makes
sanctions, including costs and attorney's fees, mandatory when violations of the
requirement occur.
II. THE

RULE AS AMENDED

The 1983 amendments to rule 11 altered the language of the rule's certification
requirements and made several changes to its enforcement provisions. 32 The impact of the rule, however, stems as much from the drafters' decision to "make
the profession aware" of the rule and the obligations it imposes 33 as it does from
the amendments themselves. This part will discuss the rule's certification and
enforcement provisions and explore the differing views of two of the rule's leading exponents regarding the purpose of its sanctions provisions.
A. THE SIGNER'S CERTIFICATION

1. Reasonable Inquiry
The rule clarifies the former requirement that there be "good ground to support" a paper by focusing expressly on both the factual and legal elements of that
requirement. A lawyer (or party filing pro se) certifies by his signature that "to
the best of his knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry" the paper is well-grounded in fact and warranted by existing law or 34a
good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law.
31. The amended rule requires the attorney to sign "[e]very pleading, motion, and other paper." FED.
R. CIV. P. 11.
32. The rule now reads:
Every pleading, motion, andotherpaperof a party represented by an attorney shall be signed by
at least one attorney of record in his individual name, whose address shall be stated. A party
who is not represented by an attorney shall sign his pleading motion, or otherpaperand state his
address. Except when otherwise specifically provided by rule or statute, pleadings need not be
verified or accompanied by affidavit. The rule in equity that the averments of an answer under
oath must be overcome by the testimony of two witnesses or of one witness sustained by corroborating circumstances is abolished. The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the pleading, motion, or other paper,that to the best of his
knowledge, information, and belief [there is good ground to support it; and that it is not interposed for delay] formed after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is warrantedby
existing law or a goodfaith argumentfor the extension, modification, or reversalof existing law,
and that it is not interposedfor any improperpurpose, such as to harassor to cause unnecessary
delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation. If a pleading, motion, or other paper is not
signed, [or is signed with the intent to defeat the purpose of this rule, it may be stricken as sham
and false and the action may proceed as though the pleading had not been served. For a wilful
violation of this rule an attorney may be subjected to appropriate disciplinary action. Similar
action may be taken if scandalous or indecent matter is inserted.] it shall be stricken unless
signedpromptly after the omission is called to the attention of the pleaderor movant. Ifa pleading, motion, or otherpaperis signed in violation of this rule, the court upon motion or upon its own
initiative, shall impose upon the person who signed it, a representedparty, or both, an appropriate
sanction, which may include an order to pay to the otherpartyorpartiesthe amount of the reasonable expenses incurredbecause of the filing of the pleading, motion, or other paper,including a
reasonableattorney'sfee.
FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (new language in italics; deleted language in brackets).
33. Miller & Culp, Litigation Costs, supra note 4, at 24 col. 4. ("the revision of Rules 7 and 11 is as
much a psychological exercise to get the attention of the bench and the bar as it is to make a significant
change in their content").
34. FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
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The major change is the requirement of reasonable inquiry;3 5 the rule now imposes an affirmative duty to investigate the facts and the law that was not explicit
under the former rule or the cases interpreting it.36 The Advisory Committee
commented that the new "standard is more stringent than the original good-faith
formula, and thus it is expected that a greater range of circumstances will trigger
its violation."

'37

A lawyer's failure to make the required inquiry will result in sanctions, regardless of her subjective good faith.38 The language of the rule no longer restricts

sanctions to "wilful" violations. 39 Thus, sanctions have been imposed under the

rule for naming the wrong defendant as a result of inadequate prefiling investigation, 40 for bringing an action clearly barred by res judicata, 4 1 for failing to meet
the amount in controversy requirement for diversity jurisdiction, 42 for making a
motion to dismiss for improper venue when venue was proper and the factual
basis for venue was readily ascertainable, 4 3 and for bringing claims lacking an
adequate factual basis. 44
In making the required certification, the lawyer cannot rely on the client's
word alone, if further investigation of the facts can reasonably be undertaken to
confirm or deny the client's story.45 In addition, some courts and commentators
35. 2A J. MOORE & J. LucAs, MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 11.02[2] n.7 (1986) ("The principal
change in the standard, if there is one, lies in the requirement of 'reasonable inquiry.' ").
36. C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 13, § 1333, at 499-500 ("the cases [under the former rule] do
not make it clear to what)extent an attorney must investigate his client's case prior to signing").
37. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note.
38. Initially, a number of courts applied the subjective bad faith standard of the pre-amendment rule to
post-amendment cases. In the Seventh Circuit, for example, such decisions were apparently due to confusing language in two cases decided after August, 1983, but dealing with pre-amendment conduct. Gieringer v. Silverman, 731 F.2d 1272, 1281-82 (7th Cir. 1984) ("wilful" bad faith necessary to trigger rule
11); Suslick v. Rothschild Sec. Corp., 741 F.2d 1000, 1007 (7th Cir. 1984) (subjective bad faith test applied); see In re Ronco, 105 F.R.D. 493, 497 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (discussing confusion in Seventh Circuit
regarding rule 11 standard). The Seventh Circuit has since explicitly adopted an objective test for sanctions under amended rule 11. Rodgers v. Lincoln Towing Serv., 771 F.2d 194, 205 (7th Cir. 1985).
Several other circuits have also applied an objective standard. Zaldivar v. City of Los Angeles, 780 F.2d
823, 832 (9th Cir. 1986); Eavanson, Auchmuty & Greenwald v. Holtzman, 775 F.2d 535, 540 (3d Cir.
1985); Westmoreland v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 770 F.2d 1168, 1177 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Eastway
Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 762 F.2d 243, 253 (2nd Cir. 1985); Davis v. Veslan Enters., 765 F.2d
494, 497-98 (5th Cir. 1985).
39. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (1980) (amended 1983).
40. Thompson v. Midland Prods., No. 83-7469 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 1, 1984); Phillipp Bros. v. S.S. Sea-Land
Galloway, No. 83-580-N (E.D. Va. Feb. 14, 1984).
41. Pallante v. Paine Webber, Jackson & Curtis, No. 84 Civ. 5761 (S.D.N.Y. May 14, 1985); Cannon v.
Loyola Univ., 609 F. Supp. 1010 (N.D. Ill. 1985), aff'd, 784 F.2d 777 (7th Cir. 1986); Bookkeepers Tax
Servs. v. National Cash Register Co., 598 F. Supp. 336 (E.D. Tex. 1984). Ellingson v. Burlington Northern, 653 F.2d 1327 (9th Cir. 1981), reached a similar result under former rule 11, where the claim was
"patently" barred by res judicata. Id. at 1332.
42. Hochalter v. Century 21 Hallmark, No. 84-7924 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 13, 1985).
43. Coburn Optical Indus. v. Cilco, Inc., 610 F. Supp. 656 (M.D.N.C. 1985).
44. Mohammed v. Union Carbide, 606 F. Supp. 252 (E.D. Mich. 1985) (defamation); Florida Monument Builders v. All Faiths Memorial Gardens, 605 F. Supp. 1324 (S.D. Fla. 1984) (conspiracy); Mineral
Eng'g Co. v. Wold, 575 F. Supp. 166 (D. Colo. 1983) (motion to disqualify counsel).
45. Coburn Optical Indus. v. Cilco, Inc., 610 F. Supp. 656, 659 (M.D.N.C. 1985) ("If all the attorney
has is his client's assurance that facts exist or do not exist, when a reasonable inquiry would reveal otherwise, he has not satisfied his obligation [under Rule I 1]."); Kendrick v. Zanides, 609 F. Supp. 1162, 1172
(N.D. Cal. 1985) (where counsel has document refuting client's allegations, he must investigate); Thompson v. Midland Prods., No. 83-7469, slip op. at 5 (N.D. Ill. Jan 20, 1984) (phone call sufficient to reconcile
client's confusion regarding identity of employer against whom he sought to bring action); see also
Schwarzer, Sanctions Under the New Rule 11-A Closer Look, 104 F.R.D. 181, 187 (1985) ("What is
crucial under the rule is not who makes the inquiry, but whether as a result the attorney has acquired
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have interpreted the "reasonable inquiry" requirement to vary with the lawyer's
expertise in the field and access to research sources, 46
creating heightened standards of performance for certain segments of the bar.
2. Improper Purpose
The rule also expands the certification requirement with respect to the purpose
of the filing. It now prohibits filing for "any improper purpose," not just for
delay. This change recognizes that there are numerous tactical reasons for filing
papers beside causing delay. 47 The rule now gives the
courts greater freedom to
48
deal with "groundless, bad faith procedural moves."
Although courts and commentators have stressed that rule 11 introduces an
objective standard to measure a lawyer's conduct, 4 9 it is more accurate to say
that the rule adds an objective layer to the subjective core of traditionally sanctionable bad faith conduct.
No prefiling inquiry can uncover law that does not yet exist, and a "good
faith" standard is expressly retained in connection with arguments for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law. 50 Moreover, the improper purpose standard requires that the court attempt to fathom the motives of the
signer. As one court described the test: "What an attorney is deemed to certify
is both 1) his or her 'knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable
inquiry'--an objective test-and 2) the absence of 'any improper purpose'-a
subjective test that supported the old 'bad faith' requirement." 5 1 Under the new
knowledge of the facts sufficient to enable him to certify that the paper is grounded in fact."). Judge
Schwarzer's provocative rule I1 decisions are discussed at length below. See infra notes 149-65, 21748
and accompanying text.
46. Schwarzer, supra note 45, at 194; See, eg., Golden Eagle Distrib. Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 103
F.R.D. 124, 129 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (Schwarzer, J.) (noting counsel's access to LEXIS), rev'd, No. 84-2602
(9th Cir. Oct. 9, 1986); Pallante v. Paine Webber, Jackson & Curtis, No. 84 Civ. 5761 (S.D.N.Y. May 14,
1985) (counsel in specialized area of law must not pursue litigation lacking adequate basis in law).
47. See FED. R. CIv. P. I1 advisory committee's note (recognizing delay only one of many improper

purposes for abusing litigation process).
48. Browning Debenture Holder's Comm. v. Dasa Corp., 560 F.2d 1078, 1088-89 (2d Cir. 1977). The
court in Browning listed a number of procedural maneuvers it felt were impermissible: appeal of mooted
issues, frivolous motion for summary judgment, and dragnet subpoenas. Id. at 1088.
49. See supra note 38; Schwarzer, supra note 45, at 185 ("the rule, although derived from precedents
resting on bad faith, is not so limited").
50. The language of the rule comes from disciplinary rule 7-102(A)(2) of the American Bar Association
Model Code of Professional Responsibility which provides:
(A) In his representation of a client, a lawyer shall not:
i2) Knowingly advance a claim or defense that is unwarranted under existing law, except
that he may advance such claim or defense if it can be supported by a good faith argument for an
extension, modification, or reversal of existing law.
See Pudlo v. Director, IRS, 587 F. Supp. 1010, 1011 (N.D. Ill. 1984) ("Rule 11 is objective in its application except to the extent a litigant argues for a change in the law.").
51. In re Ronco, 105 F.R.D. 493, 495 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (emphasis in original); see McLaughlin v. Wester Casualty & Sur. Co., 603 F. Supp. 978, 981 (S.D. Ala. 1985) ("First, the attorney must make a
reasonable inquiry into both the facts of the case and the law .... Second, the pleading must not be
interposed for an improper purpose."); 2A J. MOORE & J. LucAS, supra note 35, I11.02[2] n.7 ("to fall
within the 'improper purpose' language it will usually be necessary to demonstrate some subjective bad
faith"). Judge Schwarzer maintains that the court "need not delve into the attorney's subjective intent" in
deciding whether a paper has been filed for an improper purpose. Schwarzer, supra note 45, at 195. He
argues that improper purpose may be objectively determined because it can be based on a finding from the
record that the filing "caused delay that was unnecessary... caused increase in the cost of litigation that
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rule, then, as under the old, the state of mind of the signer may still play a
significant role, either in determining whether sanctions5 2are warranted at all or
in deciding the severity of the sanctions to be imposed.
B. ENCOURAGING THE USE OF SANCTIONS

In addition to broadening the scope of sanctionable activity, rule 11 marks a
dramatic shift in attitude toward the use of sanctions. The court's options are no
longer limited to the drastic-and therefore rarely imposed-sanction of striking
the offending pleading. Instead, the rule makes sanctions mandatory but leaves
the specific sanction to the discretion of the judge, allowing it to be tailored to fit
the situation.5 3 In addition, the rule provides that sanctions may be imposed
upon the signer, a represented party, or both, depending on the violation. Thus,
what was once a blunt instrument of power is now a flexible and efficient case

management tool.
1. Mandatory Sanctions

Once a violation of any of the certification requirements is found, rule 11
makes sanctions mandatory.5 4 The court does not have discretion, as it would
under rule 37, 28 U.S.C. § 1927, or its inherent powers, to conclude that sanctions are unwarranted and to deny them. 55 This limitation on judicial discretion
was imposed to "focus the court's attention" on dealing with abuse and misuse
of the litigation process.5 6 One comprehensive study of sanctions under the Fed-

eral Rules prepared in 1981 concluded that "delay, obfuscation, contumacy, and
lame excuses on the part of litigants and their attorneys are tolerated without
57
any measured remedial action until the court is provoked beyond endurance."
The perceived reluctance of judges to impose sanctions has several sources:
judges' sympathy, as former practitioners, for the pressures on lawyers in the
was needless, or.... lacked any apparentlegitimate purpose." Id. at 195 (emphasis added). This attempt
to "objectify" the inquiry circumvents the plain language of the rule, which addresses the lawyer's "purpose" in filing a paper, not merely the effect of its filing. The rulemakers, however, in incorporating and
expanding the "delay" provision of the old rule, have retained its subjective element. At an earlier point
in his article Judge Schwarzer seems to recognize this inherently subjective aspect when he says that
"[t]he key to invoking Rule 11, therefore, is the nature of the conduct of counsel and the parties, not the
outcome." Id. at 185.
52. See In re Ronco, 105 F.R.D. at 498 ("though 'improper purpose' could well be an aggravating
factor under the revised Rule, its absence does not insulate from sanctions the lawyer who fails the alternative objective standard") (emphasis in original); infra notes 113-127 and accompanying text.
53. "The court... retains the necessary flexibility to deal appropriately with violations of the rule. It
has discretion to tailor sanctions to the particular facts of the case, with which it should be well acquainted." FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory committee's note.
54. "If a pleading, motion, or other paper is signed in violation of this rule, the court... shall impose
...an appropriate sanction.... ." FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
55. See Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 762 F.2d 243 (2d Cir. 1985) (reversing trial court's
denial of sanctions sought by defendant under rule 11 for plaintiff's baseless antitrust claim). The court
stated, "Unlike the statutory provisions that vest the district court with 'discretion' to award fees, Rule 11
is clearly phrased as a directive. Accordingly, where strictures of the rule have been transgressed, it is
incumbent upon the district court to fashion proper sanctions." Id. at 254 n.7.
56. "The text of the amended rule seeks to dispel apprehensions that efforts to obtain enforcement will
be fruitless by insuring that the rule will be applied when properly invoked ....
And the words 'shall
impose' in the last sentence focus the court's attention on the need to impose sanctions for pleading and
motion abuse." FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note.
57. R. ROPEs, K. RIPPLE & C. MOONEY, supra note 2, at 85.
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adversary system; concern that available sanctions often punish the client for the
lawyer's misdeeds; and uncertainty about the court's power to impose sanctions
on its own initiative.5 8 Rule 11 deals with each of these obstacles to effective use
of sanctions. By making sanctions mandatory, the drafters of rule 11 sought to
discourage any collegial inclination to overlook or minimize violations. They
also hoped to maximize the deterrent effect of sanctions, a goal expressly approved by the Supreme Court in National Hockey League v. Metropolitan
Hockey Club.5 9
2. Retained Discretion
Although rule 11 makes sanctions mandatory, flexibility is preserved by expressly leaving to the court the selection of "an appropriate sanction."' 60 The
only sanction explicitly provided for is an award of reasonable costs and attorney's fees "incurred because of" the violation, but the rule gives the court discretion to fashion other sanctions to fit the situation before it. In addition, the court
must find that rule 11 has been violated before the issue of sanctions even arises.
Rule 11 gives the court additional discretion, and necessary flexibility, by providing that sanctions may be awarded against the lawyer, the client, or both,
depending on the nature of the violation and the relative responsibility of those
involved. This change resolves the former dilemma about punishing an innocent
client or doing nothing. 6 1 It also puts lawyers on notice that they will have to
take responsibility for conducting litigation in a professional manner or run the
risk of personal liability for sanctions.
3. Who Has Responsibility for Enforcing the Rule?
Under rule 11, the court may deal with violations on its own initiative, as well
as on a party's motion. By expressly authorizing sua sponte consideration of
sanctions the rule should end any uncertainty in this area. 62 In addition, it reinforces a central theme of the 1983 amendments: the importance of case management and the role of sanctions as a tcol for controlling litigation. The judge is
urged by the rule and by the accompanying advisory committee's notes to scrutinize lawyers' conduct
as "part of [her] responsibility for securing the system's
' 63
effective operation.
The impact of rule 1 l's mandatory sanctions is softened by the elements of
58. "Courts currently appear to believe they may impose sanctions on their own motion. Authority to
do so has been made explicit in order to overcome the traditional reluctance of courts to intervene unless
requested by one of the parties." FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note (citation omitted). On
judicial reluctance to impose sanctions and on the usefulness of sanctions to deal with litigation abuse, see
generally the articles cited supra note 2; Sofaer, SanctioningAttorneysfor Discovery Abuse Under the New
FederalRules: On the Limited Utility ofPunishment, 57 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 680 (1983) (examining 1983
amendments prior to enactment).

59. 427 U.S. 639, 643 (1976) (per curiam) (sanctions warranted "not merely to penalize... but to deter
those who might be tempted to such conduct in the absence of such a deterrent"). The Advisory Committee has emphasized this function. "The word 'sanctions' in the caption, for example, stresses a deterrent
orientation in dealing with improper... papers." FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note.
60. FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
61. See R. RODES, K. RiPPLE & C. MOONEY, supra note 2, at 70 (citing Comment, Recent Innovations
to PretrialDiscovery Sanctions: Rule 37 Reinterpreted, 1959 DUKE L.J. 278, 280-82).
62. See supra note 58.
63. FED. R. Civ. P. I1 advisory committee's note.
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continued discretion noted above. Nonetheless, the message is clear. The rule
seeks to eliminate whatever reluctance judges may have had to sanction those
who misuse the litigation process.64 It puts lawyers on notice that they can no
has been termed an "empty head, pure heart" defense of
longer hide behind what
65
their litigation tactics.
C. THE PURPOSE OF SANCTIONS: COMPENSATION,
PUNISHMENT AND DETERRENCE

Two divergent views have emerged regarding the function of rule 11 sanctions.
One emphasizes the economics of litigation, noting the rule's objective standards
and its focus on the costs incurred by the nonviolator as the basic measure of
sanctions. The other recognizes that the very word "sanctions" connotes punishment, with its implication of misconduct that requires corrective action by the
court. These conflicting conceptions of sanctions-both of which include a deterrence aspect-have found proponents who are outspoken supporters of the
rule. Professor Arthur Miller, Reporter to the Civil Rules Advisory Committee
that fashioned the 1983 amendments, advocates the economic approach, while
District of California has emphaJudge William W Schwarzer of the Northern
66
sized the punitive aspects of sanctions.
1. Compensation or Punishment?
The language of rule 11, and the accompanying advisory committee's notes,
no longer refer to subjective bad faith, willfulness, and the like, standards that
have restricted the use of sanctions over the years. 67 The purpose of the exrequirement, according to Professor Miller, is to impose a
panded certification
"stop and think" 68 obligation on lawyers, in order to "skim off the frivolous and
improperly motivated lawsuits, motions and discovery that are polluting the federal system."'69 Professor Miller has even asserted that the word "sanctions" in
the rule is a misnomer. "Although denominated a sanction provision, in reality
it is more appropriately characterized as a cost-shifting technique ....To some
64. Schwarzer, supra note 45, at 187. As the advisory committee's note suggests, "the new language is
intended to reduce the reluctance of courts to impose sanctions by emphasizing the responsibilities of the
attorney and reinforcing those obligations by the imposition of sanctions." FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory
committee's note (citations omitted); cf.Renfrew, supranote 2, at 79-84 (judges need not wait for lawyers
to request sanctions; judges hesitate to punish clients for sins of lawyers, fear abuse of sanctions motions);
Brazil, supra note 4, at 927-28 (judges, many of whom were litigators, empathize with zealous attorneys
and refrain from imposing sactions).
1985).
65. In re Ronco, 105 F.R.D. 493, 496 (N.D. I11.
66. See articles and cases cited supra notes 4 and 45.
67. See supra note 16 and accompanying text (noting limited use of pre-amendment rule 11 sanction
power); Roadway Express v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 766 (1980) (a finding of bad faith must precede any
sanctions against a lawyer under the court's inherent powers).
68. Miller & Culp, Litigation Costs, supra note 4, at 34, col. 1.
69. A. MILLER, supra note 4, at 18-19; see Zimmerman v. Schweiker, 575 F. Supp. 1436, 1441
(E.D.N.Y. 1983) ("This [reasonable inquiry] language represents an attempt to increase litigators' responsibility to keep ill-founded complaints and defenses out of court."). Such a facially modest view of the
drafters' goal in amending rule 11 presupposes a high degree of judicial restraint in exercising the sanction
power that goes with it. By and large that expectation has been met. As will be discussed below, however,
some of the problems foreseen by the drafters have arisen in cases where judges have taken a more expansive view of the rule's sweep and have interpreted it as a mandate to reform the adversary system. See
infra notes 155-249 and accompanying text.
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degree this alters the traditional American approach to costs and brings it closer
to the British system."' 70 Professor Miller's view is supported by the fact that the
only sanction explicitly recommended in the rule is "the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because of the filing... including a reasonable attorney's
1
fee."

7

By contrast, Judge Schwarzer espouses the view that the rule is aimed at punishing offenders, as well as deterring those who might be inclined to similar actions: "The rule provides for sanctions, not fee shifting. It is aimed at deterring
conduct rather than merely compensating the prevailing party. The key to invoking Rule 11, therefore, is the nature of the conduct of counsel and the parties,
not the outcome."'72 His interpretation is at least partially consistent with the
very advisory committee's notes formulated by Professor Miller: "The word
'sanctions' in the caption, for example, stresses a deterrent orientation in dealing
' 73
with improper pleadings, motions, or other papers."
In Professor Miller's lexicon, rule 11 sanctions are simply an economically
rational method of encouraging lawyers to "stop and think" before they file
pleadings or motions. His emphasis on the similarity of rule 11 sanctions to cost
shifting is appealing for the very reason it is inaccurate. By downplaying the
punishment aspect of sanctions, it seeks to make their imposition more palatable,
and thus more likely to occur. Yet sanctions may be imposed only when rule 11
has been violated. The rule does not simply entitle the prevailing party on any
motion to an award of fees, as a pure cost-shifting provision would. The costshifting characterization glosses over the fact that the rule penalizes for failure to
do that which a competent lawyer is required to do-that is, to make a reasonable inquiry into the facts and the law before filing papers and to refrain from
invoking court processes to gain a tactical advantage in litigation.
While talk of cost shifting tends to soften the blow of sanctions, it does not
change the fact that the rule, which mandates sanctions in the absence of bad
faith, fundamentally affects the traditional independence of counsel in the course
of litigation. 74 Judge Schwarzer's focus on punishment makes the judge the final
arbiter of a wide array of litigation decisions, with a perceived mandate to reform
the conduct of lawyers. Aggressive use of rule 11 sanctions to punish lawyers
threatens to chill vigorous advocacy and restrict access to the courts in ways that
do not appear to have been intended by the drafters. Some of Judge Schwarzer's
own opinions illustrate this danger.75
70. Miller & Culp, Litigation Costs, supra note 4, at 25, col. 2-3. Such a characterization of rule 11
sanctions ignores serious questions about the limits of the Supreme Court's rulemaking power. See Bur-

bank, Sanctions in the ProposedAmendments to the FederalRules of Civil Procedure: Some Questions

About Power, 11

HOFsTRA

L. REV. 997 (1983); Brazil, supra note 4, at 942-44; Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co.

v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S., 260 (1975) (Congress has not "extended any roving authority to the judiciary to allow counsel fees as costs or otherwise whenever the courts might deem them warranted").
71. FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
72. Schwarzer, supra note 45, at 185.
73. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note.
74. See Miller, supra note 2, at 34 ("Strong judicial management is a potential threat to the adversary
system... because it calls for a significant change in the power relationship between judges and lawyers

and in their respective functions.").
75. See infra parts III and IV (discussing, inter alia, Judge Schwarzer's expansive use of rule 11).
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2. Deterrence
Both these views of sanctions serve a deterrence function. The punishment
model makes an example of the party or lawyer sanctioned, and the cost-shifting
model imposes the opposing party's costs on the violator. In both, publication of
the court's opinion and/or requiring its distribution within the sanctioned firm,
as well as the strength of the court's language regarding the particular violation,
further the goal of deterrence.

Cost shifting itself, however, is likely to be effective as a deterrent only to the
extent that the costs incurred happen to outweigh the benefits derived, for example, from delay. In all other cases, we must assume that sanctions will be accepted as a cost of litigation and that the conduct will continue. The rule's
provision for imposing sanctions on the lawyer as well as the client could change
the stakes in this cost-benefit analysis. If lawyers are concerned about their obligations as officers of the court, they may find their interests conflicting with their
clients' over the desirability of sanctionable conduct. On the other hand, the
deterrence aim may backfire; clients may seek out lawyers who
have been chas76
tised in a sanctions opinion for obstructive litigation tactics.
III. RULE 11 IN ACTION
What has happened since rule 11 was amended? In this part I will present
some preliminary statistical data about the rule's use during the first two years
following its adoption. 77 Rule 11 decisions during this initial period reveal the
tension between the rule's "objective" certification provisions and mandatory
sanctions, as well as the significance of a finding of improper purpose in the
sanctions context. Additionally, the courts have begun to limit recovery of actual fees as sanctions. Finally, from a procedural viewpoint, I will analyze some
of the problems that have arisen under the punishment model of rule 11.
A. THE FIRST TWO YEARS: A STATISTICAL SUMMARY

When rule 11 was promulgated, there was some concern that it might lie dormant, much like its predecessor, despite the efforts of the rulemakers to en76. The author has heard of instances in which a sanctions opinion has brought the sanctioned lawyer
new business as a certified hard-nosed litigator.
77. Prof. Georgene Vairo of Fordhan University Law School has compiled a substantial amount of
material on rule 11. Vairo, Analysis of August 1, 1983 Amendments to the FederalRules of Civil Procedure, in 1 CIVIL PROCEDURE AND LITIGATION IN FEDERAL AND STATE COURTS 43-102 (1985). The
Federal Procedure Committee of the American Bar Association's Litigation Section also compiled a survey of rule 11 decisions in connection with the October 1985 meeting of the Litigation Section, in Dallas,
Tex. SANCTIONS, RULE 11 AND OTHER PowERs (A.B.A. Section of Litigation 1986); see also KASSIN,
AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF RULE 11 SANCTIONS (1985); Note, Civil Procedure-TheDemise of a Subjective Bad Faith Standard Under Amended Rule 11, 59 TEMP. L.Q. 107 (1986); Note, Reasonable Inquiry
Under Rule 11-Is the Stop, Look andInvestigateRequirement a Litigant'sRoadblock?, 18 IND. L. REV.
751 (1985); Parness, GroundlessPleadings and Certifying Attorneys in the FederalCourts, 1985 UTAH L.
REV. 325; Symposium, Amended Rule 11 of the FederalRules of Civil Procedure,54 FORDHAM L. REV.
20 (1985); Rothschild, Fenton & Swanson, Rule 11: Stop, Think andInvestigate, LITIG., Winter 1985, at
13; Snyder, The Chill of Rule 11, LITIGATION, Winter 1985, at 16; Comment, DeterringDilatory Tactics
in Litigation: ProposedAmendments to Rules 7 and 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 26 ST.
Louis U.L.J. 895 (1982); Underwood, CurbingLitigation Abuses: Judicial Controlof Adversary EthicsThe Model Rules of ProfessionalConduct and ProposedAmendments to the Rules of Civil Procedure, 56
ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 625 (1982).
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courage the use of sanctions as a case management tool.78 It is clear that that
particular concern was unwarranted: between August 1, 1983, when the rule
became effective, and August 1, 1985, there were 233 reported 79 district court
cases in which sanctions under the rule were considered. In the 233 cases sanctions were considered 240 times. Of these 100 ordered sanctions, 85 denied
them, 42 issued warnings, 9 postponed decision on the sanctions issue, and 4
invited motions for sanctions.80
While the number of reported appellate opinions is still small, 8' the number of
district court opinions indicates that the availability of sanctions has become a
significant factor in litigation. Furthermore, since relatively few district court
opinions are published and since publication of a decision imposing sanctions
against a lawyer may be viewed as a sanction in itself,82 the actual number of
rule 11 decisions certainly far exceeds those available through computerized
legal research systems or in published form.
1. The Geography of Rule 11
One-half of the rule 11 opinions in the first two years came from two large
urban districts: the Southern District of New York (Manhattan) and the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division (Chicago). 83 Together, these two districts accounted for only 7.8% of the federal court civil filings during the period
beginning July 1, 1983 and ending June 30, 1985.84 Thus, the rule 11 activity in
these districts is considerably greater than the volume of cases would warrant.
Crowded dockets and the relative anonymity of practice may be contributing
factors to the large number of rule 11 cases in these areas.8 5 Judges in these
districts may be motivated to be more aggressive case managers and, therefore,
to encourage the use of rule 11 to curb litigation abuses and increase the efficiency of case handling.
A few other metropolitan areas have had significant rule 11 activity, but 21
78. A. MILLER, supra note 4, at 18, 37; Miller & Culp, Litigation Costs, supra note 4, at 34, col. 3.
79. I use the word "reported" to include both published opinions and opinions available through
LEXIS.
80. Appendix A lists by circuit the reported district court cases available in September, 1985, for the
period between Aug. 1, 1983, and Aug. 1, 1985.
81. Appendix B lists the reported appellate opinions available in November, 1985, for the period between Aug. 1, 1983 and Nov. 1, 1985.

82. Schwarzer, supranote 45, at 202. Although publication of opinions is important to the developing
jurisprudence of rule 11, courts must be mindful of the potential harm to reputation done by an opinion
that castigates counsel's conduct. while strong language may well be justified, the courts must recognize

that, in such cases, publication is itself a harsh sanction.
83. There were 72 cases (31%

of the total) from the Southern District of New York and 45 cases

(19.3% of the total) from the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. The only other districts with
more than 10 cases were the Northern District of California (San Francisco) and the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania (Philadelphia).

84. This figure is somewhat higher than the actual percentage of filings in these two courts because the
Administrative Office of the United States Courts does not break down its statistics by division. Thus, the

percentage given includes filings for the entire Northern District of Illinois, not just the Eastern Division.
The filing figures for 1983-1985 were: Northern District of Illinois, 22,098; Southern District of New
York, 19,519-out of a total of 535,155 civil filings nationwide. DIREcrOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE
OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT table 19 (1985) [hereinafter ANNUAL
REPORT].

85. Vairo, supra note 77, at 56.
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states had no reported rule 11 cases before August 1, 1985.86 The use of rule 11
to date has thus been concentrated in a few large urban centers.
2. The Situations in Which Sanctions are Sought
In one-third of the cases, sanctions were sought in connection with rule
12(b)(6) motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim or rule 56 motions for
summary judgment. 87 This is not surprising, since these are the two primary
pretrial vehicles for examining the factual and legal merit of a claim, and thus for
evaluating the reasonableness of counsel's prefiling inquiry.
The remaining cases cover a wide variety of procedural situations, including
other rule 12(b) motions,8 8 motions to disqualify counsel, 89 and motions to remand to state court. 90 The most significant finding that emerges from this
"other" category is the striking lack of rule 11 motions directed at defendants'
pleadings. Rule 11 motions by plaintiffs were far less frequent than those by
defendants. 91
In addition to being concentrated geographically, rule 11 sanctions issues have
tended to recur in certain kinds of cases. Although civil rights cases accounted
for only 7.6% of the civil filings between 1983 and 1985, 22.3% of the rule 11
cases involve civil rights claims. 92 Securities cases and tax suits (the latter
mostly involving pro se plaintiffs) are also disproportionately represented in the
sample. 93 By contrast, only 11.2% of the rule 11 cases involved contract claims,
which accounted for 35.7% of the filings during the period surveyed.9 4 In both
civil rights and pro se tax cases, concern has repeatedly been expressed about
frivolous suits and their burden on the courts. If the problem is real, rule 11 may
be used to cure it. Securities cases, on the other hand, usually involve high
stakes; the level of strategic behavior leading to rule 11 motions may be comparably high, in contrast to more routine contract disputes.
3. How is the Sanctions Issue Resolved?
Rule 11 provides that sanctions may be sought by motion or imposed by the
86. They are Alaska, Arkansas, Delaware, Hawaii, Idaho, Kansas, Maryland, Montana, Nebraska,
Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Washington, and Wyoming. The A.B.A. Litigation Section materials, supra note
77, list unreported cases from six of these states: Alaska, Arkansas, Maryland, South Carolina, South
Dakota, and Tennessee.
87. There were 43 instances in the sample (18% of the total) in which sanctions were sought in connection with a rule 12(b)(6) motion and 36 (15% of the total) in which they were requested in the context of a
rule 56 motion. In only two of the rule 56 cases were sanctions sought by plaintiffs.
88. See, eg., Grillo v. Harrington, No. 85 Civ. 3538 (S.D.N.Y. July 15, 1985) (12(b)(1)); Coast Mfg. v.
Keylon, 600 F. Supp. 696 (S.D.N.Y 1985) (12(b)(1)).
89. See, eg., Mineral Eng'g Co. v. Wold, 575 F. Supp. 166 (D. Colo. 1983).
90. See Blake v. National Casualty Co., 607 F. Supp. 189 (C.D. Cal. 1984).
91. See infra notes 96-101 and accompanying text (discussing infrequency of plaintiffs' requests for

sanctions).

92. There were 52 civil rights cases in the sample and 40,772 filed nationwide between July 1, 1983, and
June 30, 1985. ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 84, at table 19.
93. There were 23 tax cases in the rule 11 sample (9.9% of the total), and a total of 6,868 such cases
were filed (1.3% of the total) between July 1, 1983, and June 30, 1985. There were 31 securities cases in
the sample (13.3% of the total) and 6,408 were filed (1.2% of the total) between July 1, 1983, and June 30,
1985. Id.
94. There were 26 contracts cases in the rule 11 sample and 190,873 contracts filings between July 1,
1983, and June 30, 1985. Id.
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court on its own initiative. Judges have not hesitated to use the power made
explicit in the rule. In 30.6% of the cases studied, the court considered sanctions
sua sponte, ordering them 34% of the time and issuing warnings 57.5% of the
95
time.
Where the parties sought sanctions, defendants were most active, as the large
number of requests in connection with rule 12(b)(6) motions indicates. Defendants asked for sanctions in 54% of the cases, and they were granted 44% of the
time. 96 Plaintiffs moved for 97
sanctions in only 15.5% of the cases, and 46% of
those motions were granted.
The infrequency of sanctions motions against defendants indicates that some
of the implications of rule 11 may have escaped the plaintiffs' bar. For example,
there were no cases discussing the defendant's obligation of prefiling inquiry in
connection with admissions and denials in an answer. 98 The widely assumed
right of a defendant to put a plaintiff to his proof is not supported by the Federal
Rules. 99 Indeed, Rule 8(b) permits a general denial only "subject to the obligations set forth in Rule 11"; 100 frivolous answers violate rule 11 no less than
frivolous complaints. Can a defense lawyer, any more than a plaintiff's lawyer,
take her client's word in preparing pleadings? How much investigation into her
client's records must a lawyer do before denying a plaintiff's allegations? Strict
enforcement of rule I l's prefiling inquiry requirement against defendants could
have far reaching consequences for the entire civil litigation process, since proof
of liability often lies in the defendant's files.
Similarly, the common practice of reciting a laundry list of affirmative defenses in the answer should be closely scrutinized under rule 11. A few cases
have considered sanctions for raising defenses lacking an adequate factual or
legal basis,' 01 but they are certainly far rarer than the number of unfounded
defenses must be. If plaintiffs begin to challenge the factual and legal adequacy
of defendants' pleadings under rule 11, the use of sanctions will profoundly affect
the "game" of litigation.
95. Of the 240 times sanctions were considered, they were ordered sua sponte 27 times and warnings

were issued 42 times. In two cases, an order to show cause was entered, and on four occasions, the court
invited a motion for sanctions.
96. Defendants requested sanctions 128 times, and they were granted 56 times.
97. Plaintiffs requested sanctions 37 times, and they were granted 17 times.
98. In Marine Midland Bank v. Goyak, 84 Civ. 1204, slip op. at 4 (S.D.N.Y. July 12, 1984) (imposing
sanctions in Marine Midland Bank v. Goyak, 585 F. Supp. 1358 (1984)), for example, the court concluded
that the denials in the answer were "sham" and not deserving of detailed discussion. Despite this conclusion, the court did not discuss the scope of the defendant's duty of inquiry under rule 11.
99. See Risinger, supra note 5, at 2 n.4 (discussing former rule 11). The current rule, which imposes an
affirmative duty of prefiling inquiry on all parties, should remove any lingering doubts about the latitude
retained by defendants in answering under the standards of rule 8(b).

100. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(b). The rule also requires that "[d]enials shall fairly meet the substance of the
averments denied." Id.
101. See, eg., Carl Hizel & Sons, Inc. v. Browning-Ferris Indus., 600 F. Supp. 161 (D. Colo. 1985)

(denying plaintiff's request for costs and fees incurred in rebutting frivolous defense); Marine Midland
Bank v. Goyak, 84 Civ. 1204, slip op. at 8-9 (S.D.N.Y. July 12, 1984) ("the defenses alleged in his answer
...are, bluntly stated, stalling operations to delay plaintiff in obtaining its judgment"); Smith v. United
Transp. Union Local No. 81, 594 F. Supp. 96, 100-01 (S.D. Cal. 1984) (affirmative defenses not wellgrounded in law; interposed for improper purpose).
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4. Who Is Sanctioned?
The cases studied indicate that judges have exercised their discretion in deciding who is to pay whatever sanctions are ordered. In 38% of the cases granting
sanctions, they were ordered against the lawyer only; in 29%, against the client
only; and in 18%, against both. The remaining cases ordered sanctions without
specifying who was liable for them.
The cases do not often discuss the rationale underlying these discretionary
decisions. Certainly where the violation is a matter of legal judgment, sanctioning the lawyer seems most appropriate.10 2 Where a sufficient factual basis is
wanting or the filing is made for an improper purpose, the specific facts before
the court must guide its decision about whether to sanction the lawyer, the client, or both.
B. THE FIRST TWO YEARS: "OBJECTIVE" UNREASONABLENESS
IMPROPER PURPOSE

AND

During the first two years under rule 11, courts began to define the duty of
prefiling inquiry imposed by the rule. They emphasized the objective nature of
the new standard, although the decisions indicate that judges have widely varying views of what is objectively well-grounded advocacy. The courts also used
the improper purpose standard to sanction an assortment of conduct that went
unpunished under the former rule and to enhance sanctions otherwise available
under rule 11.
1. "Objective" Unreasonableness
As the figures above indicate, rule 11 has been used frequently in connection
with rule 12(b)(6) motions. In many instances, particularly during the first year
after rule 11 was amended, courts warned plaintiffs whose claims were dismissed
with leave to amend that they would be subject to sanctions if the amended
complaint did not correct the factual or legal deficiencies that led to dismissal. 103
There is little consistency among judges, however, concerning the characteristics of an "objectively" unacceptable pleading. In Grillo v. Harrington,1° 4 for
example, a judge in the Southern District of New York ordered rule 11 sanctions
against plaintiff and its counsel for filing a complaint in which lack of subject
matter jurisdiction over a factional dispute within a state political party was
plain:
102. See Blake v. National Casualty Co., 607 F. Supp. 189, 193 (C.D. Cal. 1984) ("While an attorney
may have to rely upon his client for facts, knowledge and interpretation of the appropriate law is his
specialty, and for which he has been specially trained. As a consequence, the attorney and not the client
should bear the sanction for filing papers which violate Rule 11 by being unsupported by existing law, or
as an attempt to modify the law.").
103. See, eg., Lancaster v. Thompson, No. 82-5548 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 15, 1985) (complaint dismissed for
failure to allege any facts to support claim while calling lawyer's attention to rule 11); Laterza v. American Broadcasting Co., 581 F. Supp. 408 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (finding complaint utterly insufficient, court
warned that if amended complaint is inadequate it will entertain defendant's motion for rule 11 sanctions);
Zola v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, No. 84 Civ. 8522 (S.D.N.Y. May 28, 1984) (finding
allegations entirely insufficient, court warned plaintiff about rule 11); Saine v. A.I.A., Inc., 582 F. Supp
1229, 1309 (D. Colo. 1984) (dismissal with leave to amend, if A.I.A. may do so within the limitations of
Rule 11).
104. No. 85 Civ. 3538 (S.D.N.Y. July 15, 1985).

HeinOnline -- 74 Geo. L. J. 1329 1985-1986

1330

THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 74:1313

It is clear to anyone with a nodding acquaintance with federal jurisdiction that that issue raises no federal question and no issue cognizable
under federal law or the federal constitution, the only bases for the
parties-all citizens of New York-to have access to this court. The
issue posed
10 5

. . .

is [one] of state law to be adjudicated in the state's

courts.

Another judge in the same district took a more permissive "boys will be boys"
attitude. In CoastManufacturingCo. v. Keylon,10 6 the judge denied a motion for
rule 11 sanctions against a Delaware corporation that had sought to create diversity jurisdiction against a Michigan defendant. The corporation had sued, in its
own name, on a claim that actually belonged to its Michigan subsidiary. After
granting defendant's motion to dismiss, the court rejected the motion for
sanctions:
It is understandable that litigants will do a small amount of artful con-

niving to gain access to the diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts,
and for a long time such efforts have been tolerated. It is our duty to
protect the diversity jurisdiction from abuses of the sort attempted
here. In doing so, we need not become punitive.
That branch of the
10 7
motion is denied as a matter of discretion.
While the Keylon case is unusual among the reported opinions for the narrow
view it takes of the obligations imposed by rule 11, it is difficult to know, without
empirical study, how persistent the tolerant attitude expressed in it remains.
Just as we cannot have a full picture of the use of rule 11 without going beyond
the reported opinions, we cannot accurately assess, without further study, the
degree of resistance to vigorous enforcement of the rule. 10 8 Decisions such as
Keylon, however, raise questions about the uniformity with which the requirements of rule 11 are being enforced in the federal system.
The rule's objective standard of reasonable inquiry has resulted in widespread
use of sanctions, but several courts have balked when urged to award sanctions
automatically to a prevailing party.10 9 For example, the current test for deciding
a rule 12(b)(6) motion is generous to plaintiffs. Dismissal is appropriate only if
"it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of
his claim which would entitle him to relief."1 10 A complaint that fails to meet
even this minimal standard is one, by definition, that a competent lawyer would
not have brought after reasonable inquiry into the facts and law, thus triggering
the objective standard for sanctions under rule 11. This logical outcome has not
105. Id. at 3.
106. 600 F. Supp. 696 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
107. Id. at 698.
108. I plan to undertake such a study, based on interviews with lawyers and judges and review of court
files. The result will be an empirical assessment of the impact of rule 11 on federal practice, as well as
judges' and lawyers' views about its implementation and proper scope.
109. See Ring v. R.J. Reynolds Indus., Inc., 597 F. Supp. 1277, 1281 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (granting motions
to dismiss and for sanctions, but stating that "mere fact a complaint is dismissed does not make the
attorney who files the complaint liable for sanctions"); Robinson v. C.R. Laurence Co., 105 F.R.D. 567,
568 (D. Colo. 1985) ("A defendant is not entitled to attorney fees as an automatic consequence of success
on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.").
110. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957).
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been readily accepted, however, perhaps in part because of the potential chilling
effect of such automatic consequences of dismissal.
2. Certification Imposes a Continuing Duty
Although rule 11 by its terms speaks to the certification made upon filing a
given paper, the courts have interpreted it as imposing a continuing duty on
counsel to revise pleadings that may have been well-grounded when filed. Thus,
in In re Continental SecuritiesLitigation,I1 the court denied a defendant's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim on the grounds that the complaint was
adequate on its face. The court noted that a motion for summary judgment after
discovery would be appropriate, given defendant's claim that there was no basis
for joining him in the suit. It also noted that sanctions under rule 11 might be
sought "[i]f it develops that [defendant] was included in the complaint without
reasonable basis, or has been kept in this case beyond
the point where his im1 2
proper joinder should have been evidence [sic]."'

Imposing such a continuing duty properly requires the parties to use information gained in discovery to refine and narrow the issues and claims on which they
intend to go forward. In addition, it discourages the use of litigation to coerce
settlement for purely economic reasons.
3. Improper Purpose
The requirement that a paper not be filed for "any improper purpose" applies
regardless of the objective factual or legal basis for the paper. As a separate
element of the rule's mandated certification, it requires assessing the state of
mind of the filing party.' 13 As applied by some courts that have construed rule
11, the improper purpose standard-connoting bad faith on the part of the filing
party-has served primarily to enhance sanctions for conduct that also failed to
4
meet the objective standard of having a reasonable basis in fact and law. 1 Improper purpose has been inferred from a violation of the objective standard. 1 5
This inferential approach to the determination of improper purpose was used
in two cases from the Northern District of California, both involving the same
law firm, which specializes in management labor law. In Huettig & Schromm v.
Landscape ContractorsCouncil,1 16 the court sanctioned the firm for bringing suit
against the union when
111.

No. 82-4112 (N.D. Ill. April 9, 1984).
112. Id. at 2. Accord Woodfork v. Gavin, 105 F.R.D. 100, 104 (N.D. Miss. 1985) ("this rule as
amended obligates an attorney ...to continually review, examine, and reevaluate his position as the facts
of the case come to light"); Schwarzer, supra note 45, at 200 ("A position that might be reasonable in a
paper filed early in the action may become unreasonable or frivolous in the light of subsequent
discovery.").
113. See supra part II.A.2 (interpreting "improper purpose" language as retaining subjective core to
objective certification requirement of amended rule 11).
114. See In re Ronco, 105 F.R.D. 493, 498 (N.D. Ill.
1985) (discussed supra notes 51-52).
115. See United States ex rel U.S.-Namibia (S.W. Africa) Trade & Cultural Council v. Africa Fund,
588 F. Supp. 1350 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (repeated groundless suits established improper purpose); Felix v.
Arizona Dep't of Health Servs., 606 F. Supp. 634, 636 (D. Ariz. 1985) (allegations so groundless that
improper purpose established); Schwarzer, supra note 45, at 196 ("Improper purpose may be manifested
by excessive persistence in pursuing a claim or defense in the face of repeated adverse rulings ... .
116. 582 F. Supp. 1519 (N.D. Cal. 1984), aff'd, 790 F.2d 1421 (9th Cir. 1986).
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counsel knew or should have known that... their client had neither a
cause of action nor any claim to invoke this Court's jurisdiction....
Given the claimed expertise and experience of these attorneys, a strong
inference arises that
their bringing of an action such as this was for an
117
improper purpose.
In Hudson v. Moore Business Forms, ' 8 the same firm represented the defendants
in a suit alleging wage discrimination and breach of an employment contract.
The firm was sanctioned, by a different judge, for filing "spurious" counterclaims
with an "unconscionable" request for $200,000 in compensatory damages and
$4,000,000 in punitive damages against the plaintiff, an unemployed 50-year-old
woman whose husband was retired. 119 The court found the defendant's legal
arguments, which sought to impose liability on the plaintiff for breach of the
convenant of good faith and fair dealing, "directly contrary to the developing
body of law in the employment field."' 120 The lack of plausible justification for
either the compensatory or punitive damages claims, the court said, "raises a
strong inference that the defendant's motive in bringing the counterclaim was to
harass the plaintiff and to deter similar actions from being brought."' 121
In Huettig & Schromm the court awarded $5,625 in attorney's fees to the
defendant union. In addition to this fairly routine sanction, the court ordered
the firm to certify that no part of the sanction was paid by the client and that a
copy of the opinion was given to every lawyer in the firm.12 2 The court also
chose to publish its strongly worded opinion, in which it reminded counsel that
"the heaviest sanction they will suffer is one they have inflicted on themselvesloss of the courts' [sic] confidence in their probity."'' 23 Given the court's condemning language, publication of the opinion must be considered a severe sanction in itself. 124
In Hudson the court awarded plaintiff over $14,000 in costs and attorney's fees
for defending against the baseless counterclaim and litigating the sanctions motion. The award was made not only against the law firm representing defendant,
but also against the individual lawyers who signed the counterclaim. In ordering
the sanctions, the judge referred to Huettig & Schromm:
This is not the first time that a judge of this District has imposed
sanctions on this firm ....If these counsel persist in stepping over the
line of permissible advocacy, more severe sanctions must be considered. Opposing parties and their counsel, the firm's own clients and
117. Id. at 1522.
118. 609 F. Supp. 467 (N.D. Cal. 1985).

119. Id. at 480-81.
120. Id. at 483.
121. Id.
122. 582 F. Supp. at 1522-23 (Schwarzer, J.). Judge Schwarzer has required dissemination of a rule 11
sanctions order in other cases, presumably for its deterrent effect. See Golden Eagle Distrib. Corp v.
Burroughs Corp., 103 F.R.D. 124, 129 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (decision must be shown to all attorneys in firm),
rev'd, No. 84-2602 (9th Cir. Oct. 9, 1986); Larkin v. Heckler, 584 F. Supp. 512, 514 (N.D. Cal. 1984)
(decision must be shown to all Assistant United States Attorneys in district).
123. 582 F. Supp. at 1522.

124. See Schwarzer, supra note 45, at 201 ("Judges are prone to forget the sting of public criticism

delivered from the bench. Such criticism, while potentially constructive, can also damage a lawyer's reputation and career ....There is a distinction between bad practice and lack of integrity."); cf. supra note
82.
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the court should not be forced to expend time and money on these

125
lawyers' reckless adventures.

These opinions illustrate the new attitude toward sanctions that has been fostered by rule 11. Although judges often felt their hands were tied by the "exceedingly stringent" test of bad faith under former rule 11,126 they now impose
sanctions frequently for failure to meet the objective test of reasonable inquiry
27
and do not hesitate to punish misuse of the litigation process for tactical ends.1
The sheer number of cases in which attorney's fees have been awarded for violation of rule 11 cannot fail to have a generalized deterrent effect on lawyers.
While everyone might agree that such a result is salutary if it deters frivolous
pleadings and motions, agreement about what exactly is frivolous would be
harder to reach. One of the greatest concerns about rule 11 was that its liberalized sanction provisions would have a chilling effect on vigorous advocacy. 128 As
I will argue in part IV of this article, that concern is well-founded and has not
been dispelled by experience under the rule.
C. "REASONABLE" ATrORNEY'S FEES AS COMPENSATION: THE LIMITS ON
KEEPING THE METER RUNNING

In 96% of the cases studied in which sanctions were imposed for violation of
rule 11, the courts awarded "reasonable" costs and attorney fees to the party
opposing the sanctioned paper. 129 Only a handful of courts
have imposed sanc30
tions other than, or in addition to, fees and expenses.'
What standards have evolved in the interpretation of "reasonable" fees and
125. 609 F. Supp. 467, 485 (citation omitted); see also Lepucki v. Van Wormer, 765 F.2d 86, 89 (7th
Cir. 1985) (per curiam) ("We will no longer tolerate abuse of the judicial process by irresponsible counsel."), cert denied, 106 S. Ct. 86 (1985).
126. See supra part I.B.
127. See, eg., Chevron v. Hand, No. 84-1954 (10th Cir. June 7, 1985) (sanctions against plaintiff for
filing rule 60(b) motion "solely for purposes of delay"); Lepucki v. Van Wormer, 765 F.2d at 89 (sanctioning attorney for repeatedly bringing suits "as a device for asserting certain philosophical beliefs about the
tax laws of the United States"); WSB Elec. Co. v. Rank & File Comm. to Stop the 2-Gate Sys., 103
F.R.D. 417, 421 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (litigation used to pursue "economic or political objectives which have
no place in the courts").
128. Miller & Culp, Litigation Costs, supra note 4, at 34.
129. The largest single award in the sample is $37,365, granted by Judge Schwarzer in Kendrick v.
Zanides, No. 84-6295 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 28, 1985). The materials collected by the A.B.A. Litigation Section, supranote 77, include one unreported $50,000 sanction in Alaska, Orange Prod. Credit Ass'n v. O/S
Frontline, No. A84-063, Order at 13 (D. Alaska Mar. 19, 1985). The NationalLaw Journalof Nov. 11,
1985, reported a case, Glaser v. Cincinnati Milacron, No. 82-64 (W.D. Pa. 1985), now on appeal to the
Third Circuit (No. 85-3483), in which sanctions of almost $160,000 were granted to 89 wrongly named
defendants in a product liability case.
130. See supra note 122. Five cases ordered sanctions in addition to attorney's fees: court fines were
awarded in Kirksey v. Danks, 608 F. Supp. 1448 (S.D. Miss. 1985); Donaldson v. Clark, 105 F.R.D. 526
(M.D. Ga. 1985), rev'd, 786 F.2d 1570, reh'ggrantedand opinion vacated, 794 F.2d 572 (1 lth Cir. 1986);
Snyder v. IRS, 596 F. Supp. 240 (N.D. Ind. 1984); Young v. Williams, 596 F. Supp. 141 (N.D. Ill. 1984);
and payment of interest was ordered on a judgment that was delayed by a rule 11 violation in Davis v.
Veslan Enters., 765 F.2d 494 (5th Cir. 1985). In only five cases were sanctions other than attorney's fees
ordered. These included paying money into court, Barton v. Williams, 38 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan)
966 (N.D. Ohio 1983), Dore v. Schultz, 582 F. Supp. 154 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); dismissal, Valle v. Taylor, 587
F. Supp. 514 (D.N.D. 1984); deeming certain allegations of the complaint admitted, Johnson v. Department of Health, 587 F. Supp. 1117 (D.D.C. 1984); and placing a reprimand in the court's file on the
sanctioned lawyer, Allen v. Faragasso, 585 F. Supp. 1114 (N.D. Cal. 1984). This unusual sanction (what
is "the court's file" on a lawyer?) was imposed by Judge Schwarzer. The A.B.A. has considered implementing a version of this sanction. See infra note 249.
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costs under the rule? The courts begin their calculation with the actual expenses
incurred because of the sanctioned filing, but they have awarded substantially
less than claimed in some cases. Although these courts recognize the compensatory purpose of sanctions, they emphasize that rule 11 was not designed to give
the party seeking sanctions a free ride. Courts have adopted a number of criteria
for determining the reasonableness of actual expenses that discourage the party
seeking sanctions from needlessly incurring fees and costs. Similarly, where the
perceived goal is punishment, courts have both decreased and increased the fee
award sought to make it commensurate with the violation punished.
1. The Duty to Mitigate: Avoiding Unnecessary Motions
Chief Judge Robert F. Peckham of the Northern District of California has
articulated a "duty of mitigation" owed by the party seeking rule 11 sanctions, to
deter counsel from unnecessarily escalating costs. In United Food & Commercial
Workers Union Local No. 115 v. Armour & Co.,1 3 1 he ordered plaintiff to pay
only $7,500 of the approximately $22,000 claimed by defendant as fees and costs
attributable to its defense against a claim alleging wrongful refusal to arbitrate. 132 While the partial award of fees did not "in any way reflect a decision
that the actions of the union's counsel were excusable,"' 33 the court concluded
that a lawyer faced with a violation of rule 11 has a duty to use the "least expensive alternative" to bring the matter to the court's attention early in the litigation. In this case, the court concluded, the suit was so patently frivolous that
defendants, rather than going through the formality and expense of a summary
judgment proceeding, should first have sought to raise the lack of factual basis
134
for plaintiff's complaint in a telephone status conference with the judge.
Although the purpose of rule 11 is to ensure that "the victims of frivolous lawsuits do not pay the expensive legal fees associated with defending such lawsuits,' 35 the court also noted that the rule "only authorizes 'reasonable' fees,
136
not necessarily actual fees."'

Courts have also denied actual fees when the party entitled to fees has
"overlawyered" the case, either by assigning too many attorneys to it or by doing
too much work in light of the simplicity of the issues. In MarineMidland Bank
v. Goyak, 137 the court, in ruling on a request for fees and costs in excess of
$7,000, awarded just over half that amount, noting that on this
comparatively simple matter there was an excess of professional services. Just why two senior partners, one associate, and a paralegal were
required to work on this matter is not clear ....

As this Court has

stated on another occasion: "undoubtedly, parties to a litigation may
131. 106 F.R.D. 345 (N.D. Cal. 1985); see also Schwarzer, supra note 45, at 198 ("mitigation principle
...should apply in the imposition of sanctions").
132. 106 F.R.D. at 349-50.
133. Id. at 350.
134. Id. at 349. This approach is supported by amended rule 16(c)(l), which explicitly contemplates

the elimination of "frivolous claims or defenses" without resort to formal summary judgment motions.
FaD. R. Civ. P. 16(c)(1) advisory committee's note.
135. United Food & Commercial Workers Union, 106 F.R.D. at 349.
136. Id.
137. No. 84 Civ. 1204 (S.D.N.Y. July 12, 1984).
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fashion it according to their purse and indulge themselves and their
not foist their extravagances upon their unsucattorneys, but they may
138
cessful adversaries."
What fees are reasonable will vary with the complexity of the case and the
court's certainty that a rule 11 violation has occurred. Some judges will undoubtedly insist on the use of the formal motion machinery whenever dismissal
may result. Nonetheless, the recognition of a duty of mitigation when attorney's
fees are sought under rule 11 will avoid an excessive burden on the sanctioned
party and diminish the tactical value of orchestrating rule 11 motions to increase
the cost of litigation for the other side. 139 It will also underscore the proposition
that the "just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action" 14 is a
joint responsibility of the court and of counsel for both sides.
2. Attempts to Mitigate: Informal Contact with Opposing Counsel
A corollary of the duty to mitigate the expense of bringing a rule 11 violation
to the court's attention is seen in cases in which sanctions were sought only after
attempting to bring the defects of the pleading to the attention of opposing counsel. In Brownlow v. General Services Employees Union, 14 1 the court awarded attorney's fees against the plaintiff's lawyer in a title VII case for pursuing a claim
even after the defendant's lawyer advised him by letter of cases clearly establishing that the claim had no legal basis because of the plaintiff's failure to file first
with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. 14 2 The court was willing
to excuse the original filing of the complaint on the grounds that the plaintiff's
lawyer might have "failed to locate authority on the issue," 14 3 but it held that
continuing to assert its baseless legal position after being put on notice of the law
by the defendant was a violation of rule 11.144
The frivolousness of the plaintiff's position was demonstrated by the fact that
in its opposition to the defendant's motion for summary judgment the plaintiff
never mentioned the cases cited in the defendant's letter urging dismissal. Since
the plaintiff's lawyer simply ignored existing law, the court concluded, his position could not be construed as a good faith argument for a change in the law. 145
138. Id. at 10; see also Weisman v. Rivlin, 598 F. Supp. 724, 726 (D.D.C. 1984) ("the hours claimed far

exceed the amount of time that should have been necessary... to dispose of the diversity issue").

139. Obviously, for such a duty to be meaningful, the judge must be willing to get involved in the case
at an early stage, as amended rule 16 envisions.
140. FED. R. Civ. P. 1.
141. 35 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) %34,886, at 35,896 (N.D. Ill. 1984).
142. Id. at 35,897-98.
143. Id. at 35,898. The court also noted that when he filed suit, plaintiff's lawyer might reasonably
have believed that Guardsmark "would waive the defense that plaintiff failed to comply with filing requirements." Id. at 35,897.
144. Id. at 35,898. The court concluded fees were justified under title VII and 28 U.S.C. § 1927, as
well as under rule 11. It made the award only under the latter two, since fault in the matter lay with the
attorney, not the client, and plaintiff would have been liable for an award under title VII. See Smith v.
United Trans. Union Local No. 81, 594 F. Supp. 90, 100-01 (S.D. Cal. 1984) (awarding rule 11 sanctions
against defendant for repleading affirmative defenses previously stricken, although plaintiff provided to
defendant a copy of a case that "laid to rest" the legal argument on which defendant relied).
145. Brownlow, 35 Empl. Prac. Dec. at 35,898. The attempt to avoid sanctions under rule 11 by belatedly arguing that a legal position unsupported by existing law is actually one for the "extension, modifica-

tion or reversal" of existing law has been given short shrift by at least one court, SFM Corp. v.
1984) ("SFM has never until now made any such argument
Sundstrand, 102 F.R.D. 555, 559 (N.D. Ill.
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Given the possible justifications for filing the complaint in the first place, the
court limited the award to fees incurred by the defendant after the plaintiff's
lawyer had filed papers indicating his intent to pursue the claim despite the defendant's letter.
In Pudlo v. Director,IRS, 14 6 the court denied rule 11 sanctions in a case in
which a petition to quash an Internal Revenue Service summons was filed one
day late. The court found that Pudlo's inquiry into the applicable law was reasonable under the circumstances and thus no sanctions were warranted. 147 It
also noted that Pudlo's counsel's prompt voluntary dismissal of the suit when
the applicable law was called to his attention militated against sanctions. The
court felt "less inclined to grant awards of attorney's fees when litigants are that
forthcoming and non-obstructionist."' 14 8 Under the duty to mitigate recognized
in UnitedFood & Commercial Workers Union, such informal methods of dealing
with frivolous complaints--common enough already among practicing attorneys-should be encouraged. When such efforts fail and the court ultimately
finds dismissal to be warranted, the fact that the party seeking sanctions sought
to resolve the dispute informally should bolster the claim for attorney's fees
under rule 11.
D. "REASONABLE" FEES AS PUNISHMENT:

MAKING THE PUNISHMENT FIT

THE OFFENSE

When the court's purpose in awarding sanctions is to punish, the determination of reasonable fees does not depend on the steps taken to mitigate expenses
by the party seeking sanctions. Instead, the court assesses the conduct and the
resources of the party against whom sanctions are being sought to determine an
appropriate sanction. Thus, where the actual fees are high, though not viewed as
excessive, the award may be reduced to avoid imposing too great a burden on the
sanctioned party, in light of the severity of the violation or the financial means of
that party.
For example, in Heimbaugh v. City & County of San Francisco,149 Judge
Schwarzer, "taking into consideration plaintiff's economic situation and inexperience," ordered him to pay $50 toward defendants' expenses in obtaining summary judgment on a claim that the judge found to be "frivolous on its face." 150
Similarly, in In re Itel SecuritiesLitigation,15 1 the court reduced a fee request of
almost $95,000 to $15,000, stating that the amount sought "far exceeds the
proper amount of sanctions for [the improper] conduct,"' 15 2 even though the
....
In point of fact this Court finds SFM's present Rule 56(d) theory is nothing more than an afterthought, advanced to pull its chestnuts out of the fire represented by Sundstrand's motion for fees."). For

the rule I I consequences of making an argument for a change in existing law which is not clearly denomi-

nated as such, see Golden Eagle Distributing. Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 103 F.R.D. 124 (N.D. Cal.
1984), rev'd, No. 84-2602 (9th Cir. Oct. 9, 1986); infra notes 217-249 and accompanying text.
146. 587 F. Supp. 1010 (N.D. Ill. 1984).
147. Id. at 1014.
148. Id. at 1012.
149. 591 F. Supp. 1573 (N.D. Cal. 1984).
150. Id. at 1577. But see Day v. Amoco Chem. Corp., 595 F. Supp. 1120, 1126 (S.D. Tex. 1984) (pro se
litigant "must recognize he is not immune from the consequences of pursuing a vexatious claim"), appeal
dismissed, 747 F.2d 1462 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1849 (1985).
151. 596 F. Supp. 226 (N.D. Cal. 1984), aff'd, 791 F.2d 672 (9th Cir. 1986).
152. Id. at 235.
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court considered referring the offending lawyer to the New York Bar Association for disciplinary action. 153 This punishment oriented limitation acts as a
discretionary cap on fee awards under rule 11 and is an example of how the costshifting rationale may yield to concern that the sanction imposed be appropriate
to the violation. The court in Itel explicitly found the original fee request to be
"realistic and reasonable" but concluded that compensation would be excessive
54
punishment.1
There is only one case in which the fees awarded clearly exceeded the expenses
incurred as a result of the rule 11 violation. In Kendrick v. Zanides,15 5 Judge
Schwarzer awarded over $37,000 in fees to the four lawyers representing the
various defendants, 156 to be paid by the lawyer who brought the action. The suit
was a federal civil rights action, originally brought in state court and removed to
federal court by the defendants. Although Judge Schwarzer acknowledged that
the complaint was not governed by rule 11 when it was filed, he awarded fees
from the time of filing in state court on the ground that rule 11 "is not limited to
compensatory remedies but may include punitive sanctions."' 57 He reasoned
that if he imposed sanctions only for fees incurred after an amended complaint
was filed in federal court, the sanctions would be "insignificant" and the lawyer's
"egregious misuse of the processes of the courts, the evil at which Rule 11 is
aimed,"' 158 would go largely unpunished. Judge Schwarzer further defended the
punitive sanctions award on the grounds that when the plaintiff's lawyer filed
the state court action, he "must be assumed as an experienced attorney to have
known that the federal government removes all actions against it to federal court
59
...and that he would be subject to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure."'
The court's rationalization about the ineitability of removal scarcely supports
sanctions authorized by a rule that applies only to papers filed in federal court.
The result in Kendrick may be justified, if at all, by reference to Judge
Schwarzer's interpretation of the punitive purpose of rule 11160 and the aggravated nature of the lawyer's conduct, which almost led to his suspension from
153. Id.
154. Id.; see also Taylor v. Prudential-Bache See. Inc., No. 83-1103, 83-1161, 83-1537, 84-150, slip op.
at 7 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 3, 1984) ("potentially devastating effect" on pro se litigant of award sought); Mc-

Queen v. United Paperworkers Int'l Union Local 1967, C-1-84-1196, slip op. at 9 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 26,
1985) (award reduced because, in part, counsel's actions "'negligent' as opposed to willful").
155. Kendrick, No. 84-6295 slip op. at 14 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 28, 1985).
156. The defendants included a federal prosecutor and various employees of the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Internal Revenue Service, and the United States Postal Service. Kendrick, 609 F.
Supp. 1162, 1164 (N.D. Cal. 1985).
157. Kendrick, No. 84-6295 slip op. at 16 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 28, 1985). In assessing the fee request of the
four federal defendants, Judge Schwarzer did deny more than $5,000 in fees and $700 in costs sought by
the SEC attorneys, on the grounds that they had overlawyered the case and that some of the travel for
which they sought compensation was unnecessary. Id. at 14.
158. Id. at 12.
159. Id.
160. See Schwarzer, supra note 45, at 185 ("rule [11 is] .. .aimed at deterring and, if necessary,
punishing improper conduct"). In Kendrick Judge Schwarzer based his fee award not only on rule 11, but
also on 28 U.S.C. § 1927 and the inherent powers of the court, both of which require a finding of bad faith
conduct. Although neither of these other sources of authority would justify awarding fees for conduct in
state court prior to removal, their applicability does not depend on the signing "trigger" of rule 11. Since
virtually every act except the filing of the original complaint (including motions to dismiss and for summary judgment by the defendants) did take place in federal court, the attorney's fees awarded were in fact
primarily for work done after removal.
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practice before the district court. 16 1 As Judge Schwarzer himself has recognized, however, imposing monetary sanctions that exceed the expenses incurred
because of a rule 11 violation raises serious problems;162"courts need to be wary
about imposing fines, which are criminal in nature."
When the desire to punish causes the court to abandon the cost-shifting policy
set forth in rule 11, there is a danger that the rule will be used to circumvent the
due process safeguards to which a party is entitled before criminal sanctions are
imposed. 163 Judge Schwarzer's interpretation of the discretion accorded the trial
court by rule 11 allows an award of sanctions that would otherwise be permissible only after resort to the contempt power, 164 with all its procedural
protections.
The fact that sanctions are now mandatory under rule 11 gives the rule enormous scope. Nevertheless, there is no indication that the drafters, in giving
judges discretion to fashion "an appropriate sanction," meant to encourage the
frankly punitive approach taken by Judge Schwarzer in Kendrick and several
other cases. 165 Instead, the rule should be read to grant discretion to award less
stringent sanctions than reasonable costs and attorney's fees, where appropriate,
but not to condone imposing fines or other penalties solely to punish violators.
IV.

SOME CHILLING ASPECTS OF SANCTIONS

It is too early to know what the long term effect of rule 11 will be-whether it
will serve the salutary purpose of curbing the excesses of adversarial zeal or stifle
161. In his first order on the sanctions issue in Kendrick Judge Schwarzer wrote that the "only reasonable conclusion is that Kendrick and his attorney., filed the amended complaint ...not to prevail in the

action, which they knew they could not, but to serve their vindictive purpose to damage the defendants'
reputations and subject them to personal harassment," 609 F. Supp. at 1173, and he ordered the attorneys
to show cause why they should not be suspended from practice in the Northern District of California. Id.
162. Schwarzer, supra note 45, at 202; see W. SCHWARZER, MANAGING ANTITRUST AND OTHER

COMPLEX LrrIGATIoN 156 (1982) ("Fines, on the other hand, because of the stigma which attaches to
them, should not be imposed except by way of criminal contempt proceedings.").
163. See Miranda v. Southern Pac. Trans. Co., 710 F.2d 516, 522 (9th Cir. 1983) (procedural safeguards must be observed except in exigent circumstances such as those in which summary criminal contempt is pursued). Although sanctions like those in Kendrick are unlikely to be imposed under rule 11
absent a finding of improper purpose, the uncertainty in the cases about whether such a finding requires
subjective bad faith raises the possibility that sanctions could be ordered without any inquiry into intent.
Although the lawyer in Kendrick was granted a full opportunity to brief and argue the sanctions issue, the
question arises whether he should not also have been afforded a jury trial, in light of the serious nature of
the fine imposed, see Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968) (constitutional right to jury trial in criminal
contempt case because penalty potentially serious), and a hearing in front of a different judge, given Judge
Schwarzer's strong condemnation of his conduct in the original order to show cause, Kendrick, 609 F.
Supp. at 1173. See Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455 (1971) (defendant tried for criminal contempt
after slandering judge should get trial before another judge); Textor v. Board of Regents, 711 F.2d 1387,
1396 (7th Cir. 1983) (on remand case should be heard by judge "who has not already expressed his
displeasure with plaintiff's counsel"); ef w. SCHWARZER, supra note 162, at 166-69 (punitive or remedial
nature of sanction determines character of contempt proceeding and necessary procedural safeguards).
164. 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1982) permits only an award of "excess costs, expenses, and attorneys' fees
incurred because of" the sanctioned conduct (emphasis added). See United States v. Blodgett, 709 F.2d
608 (9th Cir. 1983) (remanding for determination that sanctions award, justified under either 28 U.S.C.
§ 1927 or inherent power of court, represented only actual costs and expenses incurred by government).
165. Prof. Miller, for example, views the court's discretion in determining the sanction as a "safety
valve" that relieves the pressure of the mandatory sanctions language. "In some cases, an 'appropriate'
sanction will be nothing more than an oral reprimand by the court or an expression of disagreement with
the lawyer's decision." Miller & Culp, Litigation Costs, supra note 4, at 34, col. 4. Judge Schwarzer's
approach, by contrast, often evidences the tendency to "overkill" that the drafters hoped to avoid, Id.
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legitimate advocacy in the name of efficient judicial management of "objectively
unreasonable" claims and defenses. This second possibility was raised by representatives of the bar during the advisory committee hearings on the 1983 proposed amendments. 166 Mandatory sanctions, they claimed, were not necessary to
deal with the perceived reluctance of judges to impose sanctions under existing
rules. 167 They argued that the threat of sanctions created a potential conflict
between lawyer and client and that the rule would have a chilling effect on a
lawyer's willingness to bring difficult cases.168
The Committee was sensitive to these concerns. In response to comments
about the dangers of mandatory sanctions, Judge Mansfield, the Advisory Committee Chair, noted that a judge would have discretion to impose "a de minimis
sanction." 169 In its advisory note, the Committee explicitly disclaimed any intent "to chill an attorney's enthusiasm or creativity in pursuing factual or legal
theories."' 70 Indeed, as discussed above in part II, Committee Reporter Miller
has repeatedly emphasized the "cost-shifting" purpose of the sanctions provision. In his view, rule 11 is a modest, value-neutral, and economically sensible
way of allocating the costs of marginal litigation. He has firmly assured the legal
community that "the advisory committee 17did not intend to dampen the enthusiasm or the adversarial spirit of lawyers."'
Unfortunately, these official and semiofficial disclaimers cannot, standing
alone, remove the danger they address. Whatever the drafters' intentions, the
inherently punitive impact of a sanctions provision, as we have seen, may cause
such an unintended result. As I will discuss below, the concerns expressed
before the rule was adopted were well-founded, and the chilling aspects of sanctions need to be carefully analyzed in assessing the rule's overall effectiveness. I
will first examine the rule's effect on the filing of pleadings, particularly in the
civil rights context, and its relation to the pleading requirements of rule 8. A
discussion of the rule's impact on the lawyer-client relationship will follow. Finally, I will discuss Judge Schwarzer's use of rule 11 to define the limits of acceptable advocacy.
A. CHILLING THE ASSERTION OF CLAIMS AND DEFENSES

1. A Cautionary Note
It should be noted at the outset that there is a difficulty in evaluating the
chilling effect of rule 11 by reading case reports. Without access to the pleadings, or to the parties' supporting papers, the court's opinion is the only source
from which to discern the issues. A judge awarding sanctions is often advocating the correctness of his decision and is likely to do so by shaping the presenta166. Hearings on ProposedAmendments to the FederalRules of Civil Procedure, Advisory Committee
On Civil Rules (Washington, D.C. Oct. 16, 1981) (unpublished transcript on file at Georgetown Law
Journal).
167. See id. at 135-36 (testimony of John Arness on behalf of the American College of Trial Lawyers)
(mandatory sanctions are overreaction to judicial reluctance to impose sanctions).
168. Id. at 137 (testimony of John Arness on behalf of the American College of Trial Lawyers).
169. Id. at 138 (remark of Judge Mansfield).
170. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note.
171. Miller & Culp, Litigation Costs, supra note 4, at 34, col. 3.
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tion of facts convincingly. 172 Furthermore, while many judges are confident that
they can identify baseless pleadings, rule 1l's potential threat to novel or unpopular causes of action-and to ones that are difficult to prove without access to
information in the hands of the defendants-must be carefully evaluated. 17 3
2. The Extent of Reasonable Inquiry
Inquiry into the Facts.
The reasonable inquiry standard of rule 11 is
designed to reduce the number of frivolous lawsuits and motions, by requiring
the lawyer to refrain from taking positions that reasonable investigation would
have shown to be unfounded. 174 The goal appears modest enough, and laudable.
Yet the threat of sanctions may deter not only frivolous cases, but also potentially meritorious cases from being filed and pursued. 175 To reduce the potential
chilling effect of rule I l's sanctions provisions, the reasonable inquiry standard
must be read in light of rule 8 and the underlying policies of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.
For example, the judicial climate has grown increasingly inhospitable to civil
rights claims in recent years. 176 The disproportionate number of civil rights
cases in which rule 11 sanctions have been considered since August 1, 1983,
must give pause to the civil rights bar. 177 Even with a good faith belief in the
merit of a claim, lawyers may be deterred from pursuing civil rights cases when
they contemplate the possibility of being sanctioned for what a judge concludes
is a frivolous suit.
In Rodgers v. Lincoln Towing Services, 178 the Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of a civil rights claim and the award of rule 11 sanctions against plaintiff's
lawyers for filing what the district court had termed a "ponderous, extravagant,
and overblown complaint."' 179 In his amended complaint, Rodgers alleged that
the police and a towing company had conspired to bring a false vandalism
charge against him and that the city of Chicago maintained unconstitutional
172. See Vairo, supra note 77, at 88. (opinion "has the power to make an attorney's argument seem
frivolous").
173. See Risinger, supra note 5, at 52-58 (voicing similar concerns about aggressive enforcement of the

former rule, even with its bad faith requirement).

174. "Greater attention.., to pleading and motion abuses and the imposition of sanctions when appro-

priate, should ...help to streamline the litigation process by lessening frivolous claims or defenses." FED.
R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note.

175. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-3 (1979). While rule 11 may tend to

chill advocacy, ethical canons encourage a lawyer to "resolve in favor of his client doubts as to the bounds

of the law." See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3-1 comment (1983) (a "filing ...is

not frivolous merely because the facts have not first been fully substantiated or because the lawyer expects
to develop vital evidence only by discovery ...[or] believes that the client's position ultimately will not
prevail"). The advocate thus has a professional duty to err on the side of the client. This duty is sorely
tested by a rule which, in close cases, may lead to sanctions against the lawyer who fulfills it.
176. See, e.g., Marek v. Chesny, 105 S. Ct. 3012 (1985) (attorney's fees not recoverable under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1988 for period after rejected rule 68 offer of judgment, where offer exceeds verdict at trial); Harlow v.
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982) (qualified immunity for public officials, unless their conduct violates
clearly established rights, regardless of intent); Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981) (no cause of action
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for negligent deprivation of property where adequate postdeprivation remedy
exists under state law).
177. See supra note 92 (52 of 233 rule 11 cases involved civil rights claims).
178. 771 F.2d 194 (7th Cir. 1985).
179. 596 F. Supp. 13, 22 (N.D. Ill.
1984).
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policies. The Seventh Circuit affirmed despite its disagreement with the district
court's characterization of the case "as a 'relatively minor incident' ":
[H]ad plaintiff introduced some fact that would have indicated that
[the defendant police officer] indeed believed Rodgers was innocent but
was in league with [the towing company] to intimidate plaintiff, or
some fact to prove that the City maintained the policies that Rodgers
alleges, then he would have stated an actionable claim that could have
at least survived the motion to dismiss."' 80
Given the difficulty of "proving" the policies or beliefs of the defendants without access to discovery, the award of rule 11 sanctions for inadequate factual
inquiry in a case like Rodgers is questionable and may well have a chilling effect.
The advisory committee's notes warn against "using the wisdom of hindsight"
to determine the reasonableness of a lawyer's prefiling inquiry and suggest that
82
the standard must be a flexible one.' 8 1 In Mohammed v. Union Carbide,1
the
court awarded the defendant rule 11 sanctions on the plaintiff's defamation
claim, on the grounds that "charges of defamation.., by definition are notorious, public acts." Sanctions were appropriate because the plaintiff had failed "to
conduct any investigation whatsoever into [the] claims."' 183 The defendant's request for sanctions on the plaintiff's Sherman Act conspiracy and monopolization claims was denied because "the difficulty of investigating [such] ...claims
prior to the initiation of the lawsuit lessens the extent of investigative efforts8 4that
an attorney must undertake to satisfy the 'reasonable inquiry' standard."'
The distinction drawn by the court in Mohammed is essential if rule 1l's requirement of reasonable inquiry into the factual basis for papers is to be read in
accordance with the policies underlying the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
The Rules as a whole, with their broadened discovery and relaxed pleading provisions, encourage parties to seek redress through the courts both for clearly
defined wrongs and for reasonably suspected ones that can only be developed
through discovery.' 85 In cases that fall into the latter category, the reasonable
inquiry standard of rule 11 should be liberally construed so that plaintiffs are not
precluded from establishing the merits of a claim.
Inquiry into the Law.
When the issue is the reasonableness of inquiry into
the law, even greater caution is warranted before a violation of rule 11 is found.
186
As one commentator has noted, "today's frivolity may be tomorrow's law."'
A good faith argument to change existing law is not subject to sanctions under
rule 11. If a lawyer simply fails to research the law or ignores the existing law in
180. Rodgers, 771 F.2d at 205 n.8. But see Snyder, supra note 77, at 16.
181. Thus, what constitutes a reasonable inquiry may depend on such factors as how much time
for investigation was available to the signer; whether he had to rely on a client for information as
to the facts underlying the pleading, motion, or other paper; whether the pleading, motion, or
other paper was based on a plausible view of the law; or whether he depended on forwarding
counsel or other member of the bar.
FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note.
182. 606 F. Supp. 252 (E.D. Mich. 1985).
183. Id. at 262.
184. Id.
185. Risinger, supra note 5, at 56.
186. Id. at 57.
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making legal arguments, sanctions are appropriate.187 A lawyer must know the
existing law to seek to change it in good faith. When a legal position is asserted
repeatedly in a series of suits and is soundly rejected each time, however, the
propriety of sanctions becomes more difficult to decide. While sanctions may be
warranted to shield defendant from a barrage of suits,188 the development of the
law is threatened if rule
11 is read "to penalize litigants because they choose to
189
fight uphill battles."'
Thus, in weighing the merits of a legal argument, the courts must keep in
mind that "[r]ule 11 does not require a litigant to forego recovery on a particular
theory merely because [his] lawyers may believe there is a good chance of losing." 190 The possibility of chilling proper advocacy must be carefully weighed
before finding a violation of rule 11 based on a legal argument advanced by
counsel.191

Specificity in Pleadings.
Although at least one court has explicitly stated
that rule 11 does not change the notice pleading requirements of rule 8,192 as a
practical matter lawyers may perceive that greater specificity in pleading is required, if for no other reason than to ward off a motion for sanctions. 193 Such an
outcome would increase the potential chilling effect of the rule's reasonable inquiry standard by introducing the threat of sanctions for pleadings that otherwise meet the rule 8(a)(2) requirement of a "short and plain statement of the
claim."' 194 It would also be at odds with the policy of permitting less-than-certain claims to proceed to discovery-a policy that has survived numerous attacks
in the years since the federal rules were adopted. 195
187. See, eg., supra notes 141-45 and accompanying text; Blake v. National Casualty, 607 F. Supp. 189
(C.D. Cal. 1984) (plaintiff's lawyer sanctioned for ignoring controlling precedent on jurisdictional issue

after defendant's lawyer had apprised him of relevant case law; Grillo v. Harrington, No. 85 Civ. 3538
(S.D.N.Y. July 15, 1985) (discussed supra notes 104-05).
188. See, eg., Lepucki v. Van Wormer, 765 F.2d 86 (7th Cir. 1985) (per curiam) (affirming award of

fees against the plaintiff's attorney, who repeatedly brought suits challenging validity of federal notes as
legal tender).
189. Fleming Sales Co. v. Bailey, 611 F. Supp. 507, 519 (N.D. Ill.
1985).

190. Id. at 519.
191. See Blake v. National Casualty Co., 607 F. Supp. 189, 192 (C.D. Cal. 1984) (determination

whether rule 11 has been violated "requires sensitivity on the part of the court. Relevant factors to consider include the amount of time the attorney had to prepare the motion, the expertise of the attorney, the
complexity of the law involved, and the extent to which the attorney supports the motion.").
192. Computer-Place v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 607 F. Supp. 822, 832 n.l 1 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (plaintiff
not "bound to its pleading" by rule 11, which "does not increase the requirements of Rule 8"), aff'd, 779
F.2d 56 (9th Cir. 1985).

193. This may prove to be a particular problem in civil rights cases, where greater specificity in pleading is sometimes required, completely apart from rule 11. See Elliot v. Perez, 751 F.2d 1472, 1479 (5th

Cir. 1985) (courts "consistently require the claimant to state specific facts, not merely conclusory allegations" in 42 U.S.C. § 1983 cases). See generally Wingate, A Special PleadingRule for Civil Rights Complaints: A Step Forwardor a Step Back?, 49 Mo. L. REV. 677 (1984).

194. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
195. See Friedenthal, A Divided Supreme CourtAdopts Discovery Amendments to the FederalRules of

Civil Procedure,69 CALIF. L. REv. 806 (1981) (criticizing Justice Powell's dissent from the adoption of
the 1980 amendments to the discovery rules). Friedenthal adds:
From a theoretical point of view, the current practice of allowing general pleadings and extensive discovery cannot seriously be challenged. There seems to be little reason why litigants

should be prevented from establishing legitimate claims in actions in which the admissible facts
are to be found only in the files and minds of opposing parties.
Id. at 816-17.
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The 1983 amendments to rules 16 and 26 have greatly increased the court's
oversight of the entire litigation process and of discovery in particular. The
heightened obligations of counsel under both rules are added safeguards against
burdening the system with frivolous suits and unnecessary discovery. The courts
should, therefore, construe rule 1 's "reasonable inquiry" standard liberally, particularly when the lawyer
must proceed, if at all, based on a good faith belief in
1 96
the merit of a claim.

B. THE LAWYER-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP

The provision of rule 11 for awarding sanctions against a lawyer, her client, or
both, will certainly have subtle and far-ranging effects on the relationship between lawyer and client. Traditionally, the relationship has enjoyed a highly
protected status in our adversary system. 197
1. Playing it Safe
Rule 11 is designed to reinforce lawyers' obligations as officers of the court. It
encourages them to be responsible to the system and to be more candid with
clients whose cases are weak. The threat of sanctions, however, may lead lawyers simply to "play it safe" when evaluating novel or disfavored claims.
If the general trend toward restrictive civil rights rulings' 98 threatens the viability of many potential claims, it does so without altering the alliance between
lawyer and client as proponents of a claim. The liability for sanctions to which
the lawyer is exposed under rule 11, however, undermines this alliance because it
creates a potential conflict of interest between the lawyer and her client. This
conflict is not, of course, limited to civil rights cases or to the initial filing of
pleadings. Indeed, it is likely to affect a lawyer's perspective on litigation in
subtle ways. She might decide to reject a case or position because it is too risky,
or forgo plausible arguments that might vex a managerial judge before whom she
must practice. 199 Because sanctions for errors in legal judgment will generally
196. See Taylor v. Belger Cartage Serv., 102 F.R.D. 172, 180-81 (W.D. Mo. 1984) ("attorneys must be
free to assert less than perfect claims on behalf of clients... to assert claims where the facts and law are
less than certain... to utilize discovery processes ... to explore and develop facts to support established
or reasonable extensions of established legal theories"); see also Friedgood v. Axelrod, 593 F. Supp. 395,
397-98 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (sanctions awarded against plaintiff under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, but denied against
court-appointed lawyer under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 and rule 11 on grounds lawyer "was not required to
disbelieve his own client" and acted "reasonably" in going forward with evidentiary hearing despite information provided by defendants' lawyer that cast doubt on plaintiff's claims).
197. The attorney-client privilege "is the oldest of the privileges for confidential communications
known to the common law ....
Its purpose is to encourage full and frank communication between
attorneys and their clients and thereby promote broader public interests in the observance of law and

administration of justice." Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981).
198. See supra note 176.
199. See Miller, supra note 2, at 34-35:
Strong judicial management is a potential threat to the adversary system as it has existed for
hundreds of years because it calls for a significant change in the power relationship between
judges and lawyers and in their respective functions. Indeed, there are risks in imposing a meaningful duty on attorneys to act in the interests of the judicial system, rather than exclusively in
that of their clients, and in placing enforcement of that duty in the hands of judges, whose
primary concern could well become efficiency rather than justice itself.
This shift creates the risk that clients will be left without meaningful representation in difficult cases and

that the growth and development of the law will be correspondingly stifled.
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fall-as they should-on the lawyer, 2°° self-interest may lead to an overly conservative view of the merits of a client's case. While Professor Miller has expressed confidence that "those who self-select themselves into law and then into
litigation are not likely to lose their advocate's instincts out of a fear of sanctions, ' '201 their self-interest may lead them in that direction, to the detriment of
their clients and the system as a whole.
2. The Paper Trail
Judge Schwarzer has suggested that one step toward fulfilling the lawyer's
parallel discovery certification obligation under amended rule 26(g) would be to
provide the client with written instructions about how to gather the information
necessary to prepare accurate and complete discovery responses. 20 2 While encouraging clients to be forthright and thorough in responding to discovery is
certainly desirable, the creation of such paper trails may well come to be viewed
as necessary to insulate the lawyer from personal liability for any ensuing sanctions, under rule 26(g) or rule 11.203 Practices designed to protect the lawyer at
the client's expense are likely to spread as the size and number of sanctions
awards increases. While many lawyers will refuse to be drawn into open conflict
with their clients over liability for sanctions, the potential for conflict is inherent
in the rule and will lead to subtle changes in lawyer-client relations, even where
the sanctions issue is never actually raised.
3. Privilege and Work Product
A related problem, which has not yet been addressed directly in the cases,
concerns the preservation of the attorney-client and work product privileges in
the context of sanctions hearings. Judge Schwarzer has argued that the assertion
of privilege is not a barrier to resolving sanctions issues, since the information
needed to support a claim that a paper is well-founded is likely to come out in
discovery anyway. 2°4 Nonetheless, the potential for revealing otherwise protected information increases when the question arises whether to sanction the
lawyer or the client.
The American Bar Association Code of Professional Responsibility provides
that a lawyer may reveal "confidences or secrets necessary ... to defend himself
200. See supra note 102.
201. A. MILLER, supra note 4, at 18.
202. Speech by Judge William W Schwarzer, American Law Institute-American Bar Association Institute on Civil Litigation, in San Francisco (Aug. 22, 1985).
203. Former District Judge Abraham Sofaer, of the Southern District of New York, addressed this
problem at the 54th Fourth Circuit Judicial Conference:
Lawyers are going to defend themselves against sanctions. They are already writing articles
advising other lawyers to keep memos in their files about discussions with clients, so they can
defend the position they take in litigation, when and if they are accused of having done something improper. The memos would show that the client told the attorney to do what he or she
had done, or that the client provided a basis for the attorney's allegations. This sort of behavior
and state of mind potentially drives a wedge between lawyers and their clients.
Speech by Abraham Sofaer, Judicial Conference of the United States Circuit and District Courts for the
Fourth Circuit 23-24 (June 29, 1984) (transcript on file at Georgetown Law Journao.
204. Schwarzer, supra note 45, at 199.
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... against an accusation of wrongful conduct. ' 20 5 Thus, if a lawyer advised
against pursuing what she considered a losing, albeit colorable, claim, she would
be entitled to use otherwise confidential communications to shift sanctions to her
client in the event the court found that the claim was not wel-founded. Conflicts between out-of-state counsel and local counsel, whose signatures appear on
papers, may also risk exposing privileged or work product information
as the
20 6
court seeks to apportion responsibility for a rule 11 violation.
Although the provisions of rule 26(c) regarding protective orders are available

to reduce the disclosure of such material, 20 7 clients will certainly become less

forthright as they learn of the varied circumstances in which rule 11 can drive a
wedge between them and their lawyers. The long-term effect of rule 11 on lawyer-client relations cannot be assessed without further inquiry into the practices
that lawyers have established in response to the increased likelihood of sanctions.
With or without the actual disclosure of privileged or work product information,
however, there is justifiable concern that lawyer-client relations will undergo significant, and not altogether desirable, changes as lawyers seek to protect themselves from sanctions.
C. DEFINING THE LIMITS OF ACCEPTABLE ADVOCACY

How does rule 11 affect a lawyer's duty to her client? To what extent does it
incorporate broad ethical obligations based on her concurrent duties as an officer
of the court? In this final part, I will discuss the relationship between rule 11 and
the ethics of advocacy by examining Judge Schwarzer's application of the rule to
punish conduct found to exceed the limits of acceptable advocacy.
1. The Advocate's Role and Duty to the System
The adversary system has encountered increasing criticism in recent years as
an underlying cause of many of the seemingly intractable problems of litigation,
particularly at the pretrial stage. Meaningful reform, it has been argued, cannot
occur until lawyers shift their priorities from zealous representation of their clients toward a greater recognition of their obligations as officers of the court.
For example, Magistrate Wayne Brazil, in an article discussing the adversary
205. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101 (1979). See Vairo, supranote 77, at
66 (lawyer may disclose confidential information necessary to defend against charge of wrongful conduct).
206. In Golden Eagle Distributing Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 103 F.R.D. 124 (N.D. Cal. 1984), rev'd,
No. 84-2602 (9th Cir. Oct. 9, 1986), Judge Schwarzer imposed monetary sanctions only on the law firm
responsible for the brief in question, but he required that the sanctions order be distributed to all lawyers
in both that firm and the firm acting as local counsel in the case. Id. at 129; see also Schwarzer, supranote
45, at 199-200 (where allocation of sanctions among lawyers requires disclosure of work product, allocation should be deferred); Vairo, supra note 77, at 66; Coburn Optical Indus. v. Cilco, Inc., 610 F. Supp.
656, 660 (M.D.N.C. 1985) ("It is difficult for a lawyer to disclaim all responsibility for a paper bearing his
name ....The court expects local counsel.., to ensure that Local Rules and the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure are followed even when the pleading or motion is not prepared by them."). The implications of
rule 11 for lawyers appearing as local counsel have only begun to take shape. The few courts that have
considered the issue have implied that the role of local counsel can no longer safely be viewed as
perfunctory.
207. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note ("The rule does not require a party or an attorney
to disclose privileged communications or work product in order to show that the signing of the pleading,
motion, or other paper is substantially justified. The provisions of Rule 26(c), including appropriate orders after in camera inspection by the court, remain available to protect a party claiming privilege or work

product protection.").
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nature of civil discovery, has called for sweeping changes in the rules of professional responsibility and the rules of civil procedure to promote sharing of information and a joint search for truth at the pretrial stage of litigation. 20 8 The
alternative dispute resolution movement 20 9 and the current interest in problemsolving approaches to legal negotiations 210 are, in part, reactions to litigation as a
war of attrition in which the advocate seeks to maximize the advantage to her
client regardless of the social cost or the harm done to the truth in the
211
process.
It was in this climate that the 1983 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure were adopted. Rule 11, as we have seen, was designed to take a
"modest step" in the direction of increasing lawyers' responsibility to the court
system by requiring them to file papers only after making a reasonable inquiry
2 12
into the facts and the law.

Some courts have stressed that the certification provisions of rule 11 impose a
duty to the system that limits a lawyer's freedom to promote the client's interest
above all else. A lawyer has an obligation, reinforced by the reasonable inquiry
standard of rule 11, to counsel her client, "to dissuade the client from pursuing
specious claims, '2 13 and if she learns that a pending claim is without legal merit,
"to dismiss [it], even over the objection of [the] client. ' 2 14 These cases emphasize that a lawyer's ethical duties as an officer of the court and her obligations
under rule 11 may overlap and reinforce each other.2 15 Nevertheless, courts
must proceed with care given the rule's "potential for chilling legitimate advocacy." 2 16 Reasonable lawyers may differ about whether a claim warrants litiga208. Brazil, Civil Discovery, supra note 1, at 1349-50. But see Sofaer, supra note 55, at 703 ("The will to
win--so essential to effective advocacy--cannot be limited to the courtroom; it does and to an extent
should permeate the discharge of all the attorney's services to the client.").
209. See generally Riskin, Mediation and Lawyers, 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 29 (1982) (lawyers must develop
ability and willingness to mediate variety of matters currently forced through adversary system); Dispute
Resolution, 88 YALE L.J. 905-1091 (1979) (symposium devoted to analysis of goals motivating alternative
dispute resolution mechanisms, practical and theoretical barriers preventing achievement of goals, and
costs and risks of the mechanisms); Sander, Varieties of Dispute Processing, 70 F.R.D. 111 (1976) (exploring ways to reduce court caseloads through nonjudicial dispute resolution alternatives); Fuller, Mediation-Its Forms and Functions, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 305 (1971) (general discussion of characteristics,
forms, and functions of mediation).
210. See generally Menkel-Meadow, TowardAnother View ofLegal Negotiation: The Structure of Problem Solving, 31 UCLA L. REV. 754 (1984) (exploring problem-solving model as alternative to traditional
adversarial negotiations); R. FISHER & W. URY, GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN (1981) (advocating method of "principled negotiation" to decide issues on their merits,
stressing mutual gains and fair standards).
211. Frankel, The Search for Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1031, 1041-45 (1975); see
Renfrew, supra note 2.
212. Miller, supra note 2, at 19.
213. Mohammed v. Union Carbide Corp., 606 F. Supp. 252, 261 (E.D. Mich. 1985).
214. Van Berkel v. Fox Farm & Rd. Mach., 581 F. Supp. 1248, 1251 (D. Minn. 1984).
215. Id. at 1251; Mohammed, 606 F. Supp. at 261; see Weir v. Lehman Newspapers, 105 F.R.D. 574,
575 (D. Colo. 1985) (rule 11 sanction standard "is similar to the ethical requirement that an attorney
present only those arguments which are supported by existing law or a good faith argument to extend,
modify, or reverse existing law"); Taylor v. Belger Cartage Serv., 102 F.R.D. 172, 181 (W.D. Mo. 1984)
(under both rule I1 and ethical canons, attorneys "owe their clients, the judicial system and the public a
duty to analyze problems brought to them in light of easily ascertainable legal standards and to render
detached, unemotional, rational advice on whether a wrong recognized by law has been done") (emphasis
in original), aff'd per curiam, 762 F.2d 665 (8th Cir. 1985); Glover v. Libman, 578 F. Supp. 748, 769
(N.D. Ga. 1983) (attorney's motion for disqualification brought to delay suit for tactical reasons violates
rule 11 and ethical canons).
216. Fleming Sales Co. v. Bailey, 611 F. Supp. 507, 519 (N.D. Ill.
1985); see Eastway Constr. Corp. v.
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tion, and rule 11 was designed only to curb, not to destroy, the advocate's zeal.
2. The All-Purpose Approach to Rule 11: Golden Eagle v. Burroughs
As discussed earlier, Judge Schwarzer has interpreted rule 11 as a mechanism
to punish, not merely to compensate. In Golden Eagle DistributingCorp. v. Burroughs Corp., he expanded his reading of rule 11 to incorporate the ethical obligations of a lawyer propounded in the various codes of ethical conduct. 2 17 Judge
Schwarzer sanctioned a lawyer who had made a meritorious summary judgment
argument that the judge found to exceed the bounds of acceptable advocacyand to violate rule 11-because of the way the argument was made.
The Basisfor Sanctions.
Golden Eagle involved a summary judgment motion in which the defendant argued that plaintiff's claim, which had been transferred to the Northern District of California from the District of Minnesota
under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), 218 was barred by the California statute of limitations.
The argument was based on a sophisticated analysis of the interaction of federal
law on transfers for convenience with the Erie2 19 doctrine and the Minnesota
law on dismissals on forum non conveniens grounds. 220 The motion also urged
City of New York, 762 F.2d 243, 254 (2d Cir. 1985) ("Vital changes have been wrought by those members
of the bar who have dared to challenge the received wisdom, and a rule that penalized such innovation
and industry would run counter to our notions of the common law itself.").
217. 103 F.R.D. 124 (N.D. Cal. 1984). As this article was going to press, the Ninth Circuit reversed
Judge Schwarzer's sanctions decision in Golden Eagle. Golden Eagle Distrib. Corp. v. Burroughs Corp.,
No. 84-2602 (9th Cir. Oct. 9, 1986). The court found that rule 11 "does not require that counsel differentiate between a position which is supported by existing law and one that would extend it," slip op. at 16,
and that such a "requirement... tends to create a conflict between the lawyer's duty zealously to represent his client... and the lawyer's own interest in avoiding rebuke." Id. at 17-18. Judge Schwarzer also
erred on the adverse authority issue: his view would lead to sanctions depending "on close decisions
concerning whether or not one case is or is not the same as another." Id. at 21. Judge Schwarzer's use of
rule 11, the court concluded, "far from avoiding excess litigation, increases it. We must not interpret Rule
11 to create two ladders for after-the-fact review of asserted unethical conduct: one consisting of sanction
procedures, the other consisting of the well-established bar and court ethical procedures. Utilizing Rule
11 to sanction motions or pleadings not well-grounded in fact or law, or papers filed for improper purposes, gives full and ample play to the 1983 amendments." Id. at 22.
218. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) permits, with certain restrictions not relevant here, a transfer of venue for the
convenience of the parties and witnesses.
219. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
220. The central issue in Burroughs' summary judgment motion was whether the California or Minnesota statute of limitations should be applied to Golden Eagle's claim. The California statute would have
barred the claim, while the Minnesota statute would have permitted it. Golden Eagle, 103 F.R.D. at 125.
Burroughs tendered both a state and federal law basis for its assertion that the California statute ought to
be applied. As a matter of Minnesota law, Burroughs argued, the Minnesota courts would not have
applied that state's statute of limitations because they would have dismissed the suit on the ground of
forum non conveniens. Burroughs added that to apply Minnesota's statute, and thereby permit Golden
Eagle to assert its claim, "would violate the Erie doctrine of uniformity between state and federal rules of
decision in diversity cases." Burroughs' Opening Memorandum on Minnesota Law, reprintedin Golden
Eagle, 103 F.R.D. at 126.
Burroughs also argued that federal law does not necessarily require application of the transferor state's
law when the venue of an action is transferred under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). In Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376
U.S. 612 (1964), the Supreme Court interpreted § 1404(a) to require that "where the defendants seek
transfer, the transferee district court [must] apply the state law that would have been applied if there had
been no change of venue." Id. at 639. However, the Court explicitly reserved the question of whether
§ 1404(a) would operate similarly if the defendants had argued that the transferor state would have dismissed the suit onforum non conveniens grounds. Id. at 640. Burroughs asserted that Golden Eagle's
claim fell "squarely within the forum non conveniens exception" enunicated in Van Dusen. Burroughs'
Opening Memorandum on Federal Law, reprinted in Golden Eagle, 103 F.R.D. at 127.
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dismissal of a negligence claim for purely
economic loss on grounds of failure to
22 1
state a claim under California law.
At the hearing on the summary judgment motion, Judge Schwarzer questioned Burroughs' lawyer closely. He focused on the legal basis for the contentions made in the papers supporting the motion and expressed particular
displeasure at the way the statute of limitations argument had been made. In
that context, he observed:
So here we have a motion which is presented as though it is supported
by authority when in fact there is no authority. And all of the authority appears to be against it without telling the court candidly that that
is the case and without any kind of an effort to make a good faith
argument in favor of extending or modifying existing law as contemplated by Rule 11.222
He also noted Burroughs' failure to cite two lower California appellate court
cases that questioned the viability of the California Supreme Court case on
which Burroughs relied in its economic loss argument. 22 3 After denying the
summary judgment motion, the court on its own motion gave Burroughs' lawyer
two weeks to submit a memorandum "why Rule 11 sanctions should not be
imposed" 224 on him or his firm.
In its memorandum in response to the show cause order, Burroughs addressed
the issues raised by the court and argued that its original brief met the requirements of rule 11:
Each [argument] rested on existing precedent, argued for the logical
extension of precedent to an unresolved issue, or offered reasons why
the Court should disregard contrary decisions from other circuits.
Each argument for extension or modification of the law rested on legal
principles in decided cases and on considerations of policy. 225
After reiterating its legal arguments in detail, Burroughs "urg[ed] the Court to
consider that counsel's obligation to his client often requires
advancement of
'22 6
theories for which there is no direct precedential support.
In his opinion granting sanctions, 2 27
Rule 11 and the Duty of Candor.
Judge Schwarzer focused on rule 3.3 of the American Bar Association's Model
Rules of Professional Conduct and quoted at length from the comments to that
221. Golden Eagle, 103 F.R.D. at 128-29.
222. Reporter's Transcript at 2, Golden Eagle.
223. Burroughs omitted Pisano v. American Leasing, 146 Cal. App. 3d 194, 194 Cal. Rptr. 77 (1983)
and Huang v. Garner, 157 Cal. App. 3d 404, 203 Cal. Rptr. 800 (1984). The case on which Burroughs
relied, Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9,403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1965), denied tort recovery

for economic loss when the parties were in privity of contract, as they were in Golden Eagle. Id. at 18, 403
P.2d at 151-52, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 23. A later case, J'Aire Corp. v. Gregory, 24 Cal. 3d 799, 598 P.2d 60,
157 Cal. Rptr. 407 (1979), permitted recovery in neglience for purely economic loss where the parties were
not in privity of contract, without discussing Seely. Id. at 804-05, 598 P.2d at 63-64, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 41011. The two cases cited by Judge Schwarzer questioned the validity of Seely in light ofJ'Aire. Pisano, 146
Cal. App. 3d at 196-97, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 79; Huang, 157 Cal. App. 3d at 420-23, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 810-11.
224. Reporter's Transcript at 2, Golden Eagle.
225. Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition to Rule 11 Sanctions at 2-3, Golden Eagle.
226. Id. at 9-10.
227. Golden Eagle, 103 F.R.D. 124.
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rule.228 He also examined ethical consideration 7-23 of the former Model
Code. 229 Both versions of the code explain the lawyer's duty of candor to the
tribunal. Judge Schwarzer stated:
There would be little point to Rule 11 if it tolerated counsel making an
argument for the extension of existing law disguised as one based on
existing law. The certification made by counsel signing the motion is
not intended to leave the court guessing as to which argument is being
made, let alone to permit counsel to lead the court to believe that an
argument is supported by existing law when it is not.
The duty of candor
is a necessary corollary of the certification re0
quired by Rule 11.23
Based on this assessment of the intended reach of rule 11, Judge Schwarzer
held that Burroughs' lawyer had violated the rule because his statute of limitations argument was "not warranted
by existing law, contrary to the representa23 1
tions made... by counsel."
The most elemental rationale of this branch of Rule 11 is that fair decisions cannot be expected if the deciding tribunal is not fully informed,
let alone if it is misled. It is as badly misled by an argument purporting
to reflect existing law when such law does not exist as by a failure to
disclose adverse authority .... That is a sufficient basis for finding a
violation of Rule 11, regardless
of their purpose and whether they may
2 32
have acted in good faith.
On the economic loss issue, the lawyer was held to have violated rule 11 by
228. Golden Eagle, 103 F.R.D. at 127-8. The portion of rule 3.3 applied by Judge Schwarzer states that
"[a] lawyer shall not knowingly... make a false statement of material fact or law to a tribunal." MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.3 (1983).
The accompanying comment states in part:
[1] The advocate's task is to present the client's case with persuasive force. Performance of
that duty while maintaining confidences of the client is qualified by the advocate's duty of candor to the tribunal.
[3] Legal argument based on a knowingly false representation of law constitutes dishonesty
toward the tribunal. A lawyer is not required to make a disinterested exposition of the law, but
must recognize the existence of pertinent legal authorities. Furthermore, as stated in paragraph
(a)(3), an advocate has a duty to disclose directly adverse authority in the controlling jurisdiction which has not been disclosed by the opposing party. The underlying concept is that legal
argument is a discussion seeking to determine the legal premises properly applicable to the case.
Rule 3.3 comment (1983).
229. Golden Eagle, 103 F.R.D. at 128. Ethical consideration 7-23 states:

MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT

The complexity of law often makes it difficult for a tribunal to be fully informed unless the
pertinent law is presented by the lawyers in the cause. A tribunal that is fully informed on the
applicable law is better able to make a fair and accurate determination of the matter before it.
The adversary system contemplates that each lawyer will present and argue the existing law in
the light most favorable to his client. Where a lawyer knows of legal authority in the controlling
jurisdiction directly adverse to the position of his client, he should inform the tribunal of its
existence unless his adversary has done so; but, having made such disclosure, he may challenge
its soundness in whole or in part.
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-23 (1981) (footnotes omitted).
230. Golden Eagle, 103 F.R.D. at 127 (emphasis added).
231. Id. at 129.
232. Id. at 128.

HeinOnline -- 74 Geo. L. J. 1349 1985-1986

1350

THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 74:1313

failing to cite in his opening brief the two appellate court cases cited by Judge
Schwarzer at the summary judgment hearing and J'Aire Corp. v. Gregory,23 3 a
later California Supreme Court opinion that Burroughs had
distinguished in its
234
reply brief in support of its summary judgment motion.
Thus, Judge Schwarzer equated the failure to denominate an argument for the
235
extension of law as such with "knowingly" making a "false statement of law."
He treated Burroughs' failure to cite authority that was not controlling, not
known to Burroughs, 236 not directly adverse to Burroughs' defense, and already
cited by Golden Eagle as "knowingly" failing "to disclose.., legal authority...
known to the lawyer to be directly adverse to the position of the client and not
disclosed by opposing counsel. ' 237 The reasoning by which Judge Schwarzer
found a violation of these "corollary" ethical principles is difficult to fathom,
given that he expressly put aside any consideration of counsel's purpose and
good faith in the matter and that he focused only on Burroughs' opening brief in
deciding the adverse authority issue. 238 Furthermore, it is not at all clear that
the actions for which Burroughs' lawyer was punished violate
the governing
2 39
standards of practice in the Northern District of California.
Most importantly, Golden Eagle addresses difficult questions about the nature
of law and the limits of acceptable advocacy. Is a legal position "warranted by
existing law" if it follows from the rationale but not the precise holding of previous decisions? Can anyone determine with precision when a position has become an argument for the "extension" or "modification" of existing law? Or is
the line a fluid one, depending in part on the perspective of the observer? Must
the advocate, in the name of candor, cite every case that questions the continued
authority of precedent on which he relies? The answers to these questions are
not within the scope of this article, nor are they properly within the scope of rule
11.
Is the Duty of CandorPartofRule 11?
Neither the text of rule 11 nor the
accompanying advisory committee's note deal with the issues addressed in
Golden Eagle. The rule itself states only that the lawyer's signature certifies that
based upon "reasonable inquiry [the paper]... is warranted by existing law or a
233. 24 Cal. 3d 799, 598 P.2d 60, 157 Cal. Rptr. 407 (1979).
234. Ironically, Golden Eagle's memorandum opposing Burroughs' summary judgment motion did not
cite Pisanoor Huang either, citing only J'Aire. Thus, under Judge Schwarzer's expansive view of rule 11,
Golden Eagle also failed to insure that the court was "fully informed" when making its decision.
235. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.3(a)(1) (1983).
236. Both at the summary judgment hearing and in a later affidavit, Burroughs' lawyer stated that he

was not aware before the hearing of either Pisanoor Huang. See Golden Eagle, 103 F.R.D. at 129 (noting
lawyer's claim of ignorance).
237. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.3(a)(3) (1983).
238. Golden Eagle, 103 F.R.D. at 128-29.
239. Local Rule 110-3 for the Northern District of California requires lawyers to comply with the
standards of professional conduct of the State Bar of California. Rule 7-105 of the California Rules of
Professional Conduct (1985) states that a member of the bar "shall not seek to mislead the judge.., by an
artifice or false statement of fact or law." There is no provision in the State Rules requiring a lawyer to
disclose controlling adverse authority. Indeed, a proposal that such a rule be adopted by the State Bar
Board of Governors was defeated by the Conference of Delegates at the 1984 State Bar Annual Meeting.
Transcript of Conference of Delegates' Debate on 1984 Special Ethics Issue 3 at 184-85 (Sept. 24, 1984).
One of the major arguments against the proposal was that it interfered with the lawyer's duty as an
advocate and undermined the attorney-client relationship. Id. at 181-82 (statement of Darrel Horsted,
Lawyer's Club of San Francisco).
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good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing
law."24° By its terms, rule 11 does not impose any obligation to differentiate
between arguments clearly supported by existing law and those that seek to extend or modify the law. The rule demands only that the attorney certify that one
or the other of these propositions applies to the paper in question. Judge
Schwarzer expressly recognized the merit of Burroughs' argument in Golden Eagle.24 1 He imposed sanctions because he deemed the structure of the argument
to be an attempt to mislead the court. 242 Yet nothing in the rule requires a
lawyer to frame arguments in any particular way; its focus is on the existence of
a legal basis for the argument.
Even if arguendo Burroughs' counsel did violate the ethical rules cited by
Judge Schwarzer, there is no indication that rule 11 was intended to incorporate
as "necessary corollar[ies]" 243 the ethical obligations created by the codes of professional behavior. The new language in rule 11 was chosen to provide "a standard of conduct that is more focused," 244 requiring the existence of "some
prefiling inquiry into both the facts and the law."' 245 The purpose of the rule is
to deter the filing of baseless pleadings and motions, not to punish lawyers for
making meritorious arguments 24in6 a way that the court deems to exceed the
bounds of acceptable advocacy.

As already discussed, rule 11 casts a far wider net for sanctions than did the
former rule because sanctions are now mandatory and are not triggered solely by
bad faith conduct. To read the rule as broadly as the court did in Golden Eagle
leaves the bar subject to ill-defined standards and increases the risk that judges
will be merely "imposing their personal standards of professionalism on
others" 247 in making sanctions decisions. Rule 11, along with the other 1983
amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, represents a significant
shift toward increased judicial control of the litigation process. The change is
fraught with dangers, however, if it gives judges "too much power ...and too
much of an emotional stake in the outcome. '248 Unless scrupulously controlled,
the rule's broad sanctions provisions empower judges to deal with concerns
about the adversary system that go far beyond the intended scope of the rule
240. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (emphasis added).
241. See Golden Eagle, 103 F.R.D. at 125-26 ("Counsel for defendant have submitted an excellent brief
in defense of their position. It articulates the argument they sought to present in support of their motion

with exemplary clarity and fairness. The difficulty is that this is not the argument presented when the
motion was made. Had it been made then... the issue of sanctions would never have arisen.").
242. See id. at 126 ("counsel presented an argument calculated to lead the Court to believe that it was
'warranted by existing law'" when it was, in fact, argument for the extension or modification of existing
law). Since Burroughs cited no case precisely supporting its statute of limitations argument, another
judge might not have been misled into thinking that Burroughs was representing its argument as one
warranted by existing law.
243. Golden Eagle, 103 F.R.D. at 127.
244. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note.
245. Id.
246. Indeed, Judge Schwarzer's rationale does not support the sanction of $3,155 in attorney's fees
awarded to plaintiff in Golden Eagle. Since Burroughs' summary judgment motion was meritorious,
although improperly argued in the court's view, plaintiff incurred no costs "because of" the rule 11 violation punished. The award of fees represented a windfall. Judge Schwarzer might have punished the
violation he perceived either by referral to the appropriate state bar or, upon a finding of bad faith,
through exercise of the court's inherent powers.
247. Schwarzer, supra note 45, at 184.
248. Miller, supra note 2, at 33.
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249

itself.

V. CONCLUSION

Rule 11 has been widely used since its amendment to sanction lawyers and
their clients for violating its certification requirement. The decisions indicate
that courts have taken seriously the rule's broadened standards for sanctionable
conduct and its mandatory language. There is still considerable disagreement,
however, about the primary rationale for the rule's sanctions provisions and its
intended scope.
The cost-shifting view espoused by Professor Miller emphasizes the economic
realities of litigation and seeks to have costs fall on the party whose wasteful or
abusive conduct caused expense to the other side. This view likens sanctions to
the English practice of awarding attorneys' fees to the prevailing party. The
analogy is not really apt, since rule 11 sanctions are not automatically available
to a prevailing party, yet it comes closest in spirit to the goal implicit in a sanctioning standard aimed at deterring frivolous filings. By contrast, Judge
Schwarzer views the purpose of rule 11 as primarily punitive. He focuses on the
nature of the conduct giving rise to sanctions-a secondary factor in Professor
Miller's economic analysis. Judge Schwarzer believes that the imposition of
sanctions is a duty that judges must discharge to encourage lawyers to take their
ethical responsibilities to the court seriously. He has not only imposed costs and
fees upon lawyers who have violated the rule, but has published and ordered
wide dissemination of his often highly critical opinions, a sanction that may have
far more serious consequences for the offending lawyers than an order to pay
fees.
In addition, Judge Schwarzer's view of the rule's scope goes well beyond its
language, incorporating broad ethical principles related to the lawyer's duty as
an officer of the court. Although grounded in the fact that the rule does, after all,
provide for sanctions, Judge Schwarzer's application of rule 11, which goes beyond the limits discussed in his own commentary on the rule, 250 poses a serious
threat to lawyers' independent judgment and professional reputation. The punitive approach to rule 11 sanctions, if applied frequently, threatens to chill vigorous advocacy, especially since sanctions are mandatory and no longer require a
finding of bad faith. A broad interpretation of the rule's "penumbra," as exemplified in the Golden Eagle case, heightens the chilling effect that the drafters
sought to avoid.
Rule 11 was not designed as a cure-all for the ills of the adversary system, but
as a modest step toward reducing the number of frivolous filings in federal court.
To lessen its potentially chilling effect, while accomplishing the valid goals of
deterring baseless and tactically motivated filings, several aspects of the rule
249. The American Bar Association has considered including published rule 11 sanctions decisions in

its disciplinary data bank, which currently contains reports of public state bar disciplinary rulings. Conversation with Chief Judge Robert F. Peckham of the Northern District of California (Aug. 20, 1985).
This step would certainly increase the chilling effect of rule 11 sanctions, particularly if broad interpretations of its scope are upheld.

250. Compare supra notes 149-61, 21749 and accompanying text (discussing sanction opinions by

Schwarzer) with Schwarzer, supra note 45, at 202 (fines must be imposed cautiously) and Schwarzer,
supra note 162 (fines should be limited to criminal contempt proceedings).
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should be changed or clarified. First, the sanctions provisions, rather than being
mandatory, should be amended to track the language of rule 37(b)(2), requiring
the judge to impose sanctions unless the conduct for which sanctions are sought
is substantially justified. This change would bring the letter of the rule in line
with the spirit of the advisory committee's note, which emphasizes the variety of
circumstances that can affect the "reasonableness" of a lawyer's preffling inquiry. Without such a change, sanctions decisions are more likely to be made
without careful weighing of the factors enumerated by the advisory committee,
and the rule's chilling effect will be increased. Second, the rule must be read in
light of rule 8 and the general policies underlying the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. Courts should be cautious about imposing rule 11 sanctions at the
pleadings stage, particularly in view of the protections against prolonging frivolous cases found in rules 16 and 26. Finally, the punitive approach to sanctions
must be carefully circumscribed, given its potential for circumventing established due process protections recognized in the law of contempt. The language
of the rule should clearly proscribe monetary sanctions in excess of the costs and
fees incurred by the opposing party and should not permit incorporation by reference of ethical duties to the court not explicitly set forth there.
Accomplishment of rule 1l's stated goals will only be hindered by attempts to
make it a wide-ranging vehicle for punishment. The rule was amended to give
judges a more focused standard for imposing sanctions, not carte blanche to reform the adversary system. If it is applied with discretion and respect for vigorous advocacy, it can be an effective tool to "skim off" frivolous claims and
defenses and improper "procedural moves" in litigation, without chilling the
sources of change and development in the law.
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251

DISTRICT COURT CASES, By CIRCUIT

AUG. 1, 1983-AuG. 1, 1985
FIRST CIRCUIT

Sanctions Denied
In re Atlantic Fin. Management, Inc., Sec. Litig., 603 F. Supp. 135 (D. Mass.
1985) (securities; rule 12(b)(6) motion; sanction against defendant denied)
Warnings
In re Digital Equip. Corp. Sec. Litig., 601 F. Supp. 311 (D. Mass. 1984)
(securities)
Merli v. Heckler, 600 F. Supp. 249 (D.N.J. 1984)
Other
McDonough v. Ney, 599 F. Supp. 679 (D. Me. 1984) (civil rights; defendant's
motion)
SECOND CIRCUIT

Sanctions GrantedAgainst Client
Win. Passalacqua Builders v. Resnick Developers S., 611 F. Supp. 281
(S.D.N.Y. 1985) (against plaintiff)
Mead Corp. v. Mark A. Assoc., No. 85 Civ. 192 (S.D.N.Y. July 11, 1985)
(contract; against defendant)
Allen v. Colgate-Palmolive, No. 79 Civ. 1076 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 21, 1985) (civil
rights; against defendant)
Taylor v. Prudential-Bache Sec., 594 F. Supp. 226 (N.D.N.Y.) (securities;
against plaintiff), aff'd, 751 F.2d 371 (2d Cir. 1984)
United States ex rel U.S.-Namibia (S.W. Africa) Trade & Cultural Council,
Inc. v. Africa Fund, 588 F. Supp. 1350 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (tax; rule 12(b)(6) motion; against plaintiff)
Against Attorney
Armada Supply v. S/T Agios Nikolas, 613 F. Supp. 1459 (S.D.N.Y. 1985)
(sua sponte; against defendant)
Pallante v. Paine Webber, No. 84 Civ. 5761 (S.D.N.Y. May 14, 1985) (securities; rule 12(b)(6) motion; against plaintiff)
Multiphase Trading v. Stump & Co., No. 84 Civ. 1470 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 8,
1985) (against plaintiff)
Silverman v. Center, 603 F. Supp. 430 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (against plaintiff)
National Survival Game v. Skirmish, U.S.A., 603 F. Supp. 339 (S.D.N.Y.
1985) (contract; sua sponte; against defendant)
251. Civil rights, tax, securities, and contracts cases are indicated parenthetically; these cases are
discussed supra notes 92-94.
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Sony v. S.W.I. Trading, 104 F.R.D. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (against defendant)
Feder Trading v. Hoffman, No. 80 Civ. 3413 (S.D.N.Y. May 24, 1984) (contract; against plaintiff)
Dore v. Schultz, 582 F. Supp. 154 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (sua sponte; against
plaintiff)
Wrenn v. New York City Health & Hosp. Corp., 104 F.R.D. 553 (S.D.N.Y.
1985) (civil rights; sua sponte; against plaintiff)
Against Both
Grillo v. Harrington, No. 85 Civ. 3538 (S.D.N.Y. July 15, 1985) (civil rights;
against plaintiff)
City of Yonkers v. Otis Elevator Co., 106 F.R.D. 524 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (contract; rule 12(b)(6) motion; against plaintiff)
In re Liberty Music & Video, 50 Bankr. 379 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (against
plaintiff)
Marine Midland Bank v. Goyak, No. 84 Civ. 1204 (S.D.N.Y. July 12, 1984)
(imposing sanctions in Marine Midland Bank v. Goyak, 585 F. Supp. 1358
(S.D.N.Y. 1984)) (securities; rule 56 motion; against defendant)
Steinberg v. St. Regis/Sheraton Hotel, 583 F. Supp. 421 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (civil
rights; against plaintiff)
Goldman v. Belden, 580 F. Supp. 1373 (W.D.N.Y. 1984) (securities; rule
12(6) motion; against plaintiff), vacated, 754 F.2d 1059 (2d. Cir. 1985)
People v. Overton, No. 83 Civ. 7581 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 12, 1984) (civil rights;
against defendant)
Viola Sportswear, Inc. v. Mimun, 574 F. Supp. 619 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) (rule 56
motion; against plaintiff)
Unspecified
Sea Land Serv. v. H. Bros. Corp., No. 84 Civ. 0628 (S.D.N.Y. July 17, 1985)
(against defendant)
Hecht v. United States, 609 F. Supp. 264 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (tax; against
plaintiff)
Anschultz Petroleum v. E.W. Saybolt & Co., No. 82 Civ. 4498 (S.D.N.Y. May
6, 1985) (contract; rule 56 motion; against defendant by plaintiff and third party
defendant)
Shaps v. D.F.D.S. A/F Copenhagen, No. 83 Civ. 8091 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 13,
1985) (against plaintiff)
Fox v. Boucher, 603 F. Supp. 216 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (sua sponte; against
plaintiff)
Villalva v. Boulevard Hosp., No. 83 Civ. 5107 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 4, 1983) (sua
sponte; against defendant)
Sanctions Denied
Utica Mutual Ins. Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 613 F. Supp. 1134
(S.D.N.Y. 1985) (rule 12(b)(6) motion; sanction against plaintiff denied)
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Boorstein v. City of New York, 107 F.R.D. 31 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (civil rights;
sanction against plaintiff denied)
Law v. Cullen, 613 F. Supp. 259 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (civil rights; rule 56 motion;
sanction against plaintiff denied)
Church v. McClure, No. 81 Civ. 7875 (S.D.N.Y. June 28, 1985) (sanction
against plaintiff denied)
Helander v. Patrick, No. 77 Civ. 2401 (S.D.N.Y. June 25, 1985) (civil rights;
rule 56 motion; sanction against plaintiff denied)
Fustok v. Conticommodity Servs., 610 F. Supp. 986 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (securities; rule 56 motion; sanction against plaintiff denied)
Oliner v. McBride's Indus., 106 F.R.D. 14 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (sanction against
plaintiff and defendant denied)
Herink v. Harper & Row Publishers, 607 F. Supp. 657 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (civil
rights; rule 12(b)(6) motion; sanction against plaintiff denied)
In re AM Int'l Inc. See. Litig., 606 F. Supp. 600 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (securities;
rule 12(b)(6) motion; sanction against plaintiff denied)
McKay v. Capital Cities Communications, 605 F. Supp. 1489 (S.D.N.Y. 1985)
(contract; rule 56 motion; sanction against plaintiff denied)
Wohl v. Westheimer, 610 F. Supp. 52 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (securities; sanction
against plaintiff denied)
Pritchard Servs. Group v. International Tel. & Tel., 612 F. Supp. 495
(S.D.N.Y. 1985) (securities; sanction against plaintiff denied)
Connel v. Weiss, No. 84 Civ. 2660 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 1985) (contract; sanction against defendant denied)
Perfect Fit Indus. v. Acme Quilting Co., No. 77 Civ. 2004 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 7,
1985) (sanction against defendant denied)
Saxony Sportswear v. S.S. Korean Jupiter, No. 83 Civ. 6868 (S.D.N.Y. Feb.
21, 1985) (sanction against plaintiff denied)
Johnson v. Orr, No. 84 Civ. 779 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 4, 1985) (rule 56 motion;
sanction against plaintiff denied)
Totalplan Corp. of Am. v. Lure Camera Ltd., 613 F. Supp. 451 (W.D.N.Y.
1985) (contract; rule 12(b)(6) motion; sanction against plaintiff denied)
Coast Mfg. v. Keylon, 600 F. Supp. 696 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (sanction against
plaintiff denied)
Ward v. Bonanza Steak House, No. 84 Civ. 3097 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 7, 1985)
(sanction against plaintiff denied)
Hyland v. New Haven Radiology Assocs., 606 F. Supp. 617 (D. Conn. 1985)
(sanction against defendant denied)
Rosenberg v. Cleary, 598 F. Supp. 642 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (rule 12(b)(6) motion;
sanction against plaintiff denied)
Ank Shipping Co. v. Seychelles Nat'l Commodity Co., 596 F. Supp. 1455
(S.D.N.Y. 1984) (sanction against plaintiff denied)
Johnson v. Cuomo, 595 F. Supp. 1126 (N.D.N.Y. 1984) (sanction against
plaintiff denied)
Kommel Prods. v. Lettergraphics Int'l, No. 84 Civ. 582 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 10,
1984) (contract; rule 12(b)(6) motion; sanction against plaintiff denied)
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Parnass Int'l Trade & Oil Corp. v. Sea-Land Serv., 595 F. Supp. 153
(S.D.N.Y. 1984) (contract; sanction against plaintiff denied)
Kostos v. Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc., No. 83 Civ. 6305 (S.D.N.Y. Sept.
10, 1984) (sanction against plaintiff denied)
Friedgood v. Axelrod, 593 F. Supp. 395 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (civil rights; sanction
against plaintiff denied)
Meistrich v. Executive Monetary Management, No. 83 Civ. 1636 (S.D.N.Y.
Sept. 27, 1984) (sanction against plaintiff denied)
Fernandez v. Southside Hosp., No. Civ. 83-5432 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 17, 1984
(civil rights; rule 12(b)(6) motion; sanction against plaintiff denied)
Grammercy 222 Residents Corp. v. Grammercy Realty Assocs., 591 F. Supp.
1408 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (rule 12(b)(6) motion; sanction against plaintiff denied)
Taylor v. Weissman, No. 84 Civ. 357 (N.D.N.Y. June 14, 1984) (rule 56 motion; sanction against plaintiff denied)
Leema Enters. v. Willi, 582 F. Supp. 255 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (securities; sanction
against plaintiff denied)
Laterza v. American Broadcasting Co., 581 F. Supp. 408 (S.D.N.Y 1984) (rule
12(b)(6) motion; sanction against plaintiff denied)
Gold v. Blinder, Robinson & Co., 580 F. Supp. 50 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (securities;
sanction against defendant denied)
Dahlberg v. Becker, 581 F. Supp. 855 (N.D.N.Y. 1984) (civil rights; rule
12(b)(6) motion; sanction against plaintiff denied)
Williams v. Birzon, 576 F. Supp. 577 (N.D.N.Y. 1983) (civil rights; rule
12(b)(6) motion; sanction against plaintiff denied)
Hudson v. Larouche, 579 F. Supp. 623 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (rule 12(b)(6) motion;
sanction against plaintiff denied)
Collorafi v. United States, 84-1 U.S. Tax. Cas. (CCH) 9107 (E.D.N.Y. 1983)
(tax; rule 12(b)(6) motion; sanction against plaintiff denied)
Stewart Data v. Baruch Hertz & Track Data Corp., No. 83 Civ. 1565
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 2, 1983) (rule 56 motion; sanction against plaintiff denied)
Warnings
Drake v. Miller, No. 85 Civ. 0190 (S.D.N.Y. June 18, 1985)
Kleinberg v. Bear Stearns & Co., No. 82 Civ. 2531 (S.D.N.Y. June 13, 1985)
(securities)
Nordlicht v. New York Tel. Co., 617 F. Supp. 220 (S.D.N.Y. 1985)
City of Yonkers v. Otis Elevator Co., 607 F. Supp. 1416 (S.D.N.Y. 1985)
(contract)
Zola v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, No. 84 Civ. 8522 (S.D.N.Y.
May 28, 1985) (securities)
Merrill Lynch Futures v. Morici, No. 84 Civ. 2485 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 3, 1985)
(securities)
Smith v. City of New York, No. 82 Civ. 4457 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 3, 1985) (civil
rights)
Davidson v. Scully, No. 83 Civ. 2025 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 18, 1984) (civil rights)
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Bourdages v. Metals Refining Ltd., No. 84 Civ. 743 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 1, 1984)
(securities)
Genesco Entertainment v. Koch, No. 83 Civ. 1977 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 17, 1984)
(contract)
. Zerman v. Bache, Halsey, Stuart, Shields, No. 83 Civ. 7980 (S.D.N.Y. May 7,
1984) (securities)
Other
Klein v. Churchill Coal Co., No. 84 Civ. 6509 (S.D.N.Y. June 26, 1985, as
amended July 16, 1985) (securities; sanctions against defendant held in
abeyance)
Mendell v. Greenberg, 612 F. Supp. 1543 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (securities; rule
12(b)(6) motion; sanctions against plaintiff held in abeyance)
Argus Inc. & Interphoto Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 612 F. Supp. 904
(S.D.N.Y. 1985) (rule 56 motion; sanctions against plaintiff held in abeyance)
Kamar v. Esterow, No. 84 Civ. 971 (S.D.N.Y. July 1, 1985) (sanctions against
plaintiff held in abeyance)
Dooley v. International Paper Co., No. 83 Civ. 6070 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 29, 1984)
(civil rights; rule 56 motion; defendant granted opportunity to show bad faith)
THIRD CIRCUIT

Sanctions GrantedAgainst Client
Johnson v. United States, 1 Fed. R. Serv. 3d (Callaghan) 627 (E.D. Pa. 1985)
(tax; against plaintiff)
Gmelin v. Permeator Corp., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) %91,946 (D.N.J. 1985)
(securities; against plaintiff)
Thaper v. Columbia Univ., 35 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1264 (D.N.J.
1984) (civil rights; sua sponte; against plaintiff)
Against Attorney
Pittsburgh Penn Oil Co. v. Mr. Bar-B-Q, No. 84-1421 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 19,
1985) (contract; against plaintiff)
Sanctions Denied
Skepton v. County of Bucks, No. 84-4395 (E.D. Pa. July 19, 1985) (contract/
civil rights; rule 12(b)(6) motion; sanction against plaintiff denied)
Camacho v. Cove Trader, Inc., No. 85-1816 (E.D. Pa. July 15, 1985) (sanctions against plaintiff and defendant denied)
Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. v. Carr's Tire & Auto. Center, No. 82-1400 (E.D.
Pa. July 3, 1985) (sanction against plaintiff denied)
Keystone Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Krause, No. 85-0206 (E.D. Pa. June 12,
1985) (sanction against plaintiff denied)
Shiffier v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc. of U.S., 609 F. Supp. 832 (E.D. Pa.
1985) (sanction against plaintiff denied)
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Prince v. Heckler, No. 83-3176 (E.D. Pa. May 2, 1985) (sanction against defendant denied)
Amcon Int'l v. United States, Nos. 84-4940, 84-4945, 84-4946, 84-4947, 844948 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 29, 1985) (tax; sanction against plaintiff denied)
Broder v. Perpetual Am. Bank, 107 F.R.D. 213 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (civil rights;
sanction against plaintiff denied)
Fisher Bros. v. Cambridge-Lee Indus., 585 F. Supp. 69 (E.D. Pa. 1984) (sanction against plaintiff denied)
General Accident Ins. Co. of Am. v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 598 F. Supp.
1223 (E.D. Pa. 1984) (rule 12(b)(6) motion; sanction against plaintiff denied)
Pennwalt Corp. v. Horton Co., 582 F. Supp. 438 (E.D. Pa. 1984) (sanction
against defendant denied)
Warnings
Graves v. Western Union, No. 84-4191 (E.D. Pa. May 3, 1985) (civil rights)
Fogano v. Eagle-Picher Indus., No. 79-4057 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 19, 1985)
Vuitton S.A. v. J. & L. Fashion, Nos. 84-4882, 84-4883, 84-4884 (E.D. Pa.
Mar. 11, 1985)
Murray v. United States, No. 84-1572 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 20, 1985)
Linker v. Custom-Bilt Mach., 594 F. Supp. 894 (E.D. Pa. 1984) (securities)
Other
Collins v. American Soc'y for Testing and Materials, No. 83-3173 (E.D. Pa.
May 20, 1985) (civil rights; rule 56 motion; hearing scheduled against plaintiff)
FOURTH CIRCUIT

Sanctions GrantedAgainst Client
Steele v. Morris, 1 Fed. R. Serv. 3d (Callaghan) 956 (S.D.W. Va. 1985)
(against defendant)
Against Both
Coburn Optical Indus., v. Cilco, Inc., 610 F. Supp. 656 (M.D.N.C. 1985) (sua
sponte and on plaintiff's motion against defendant)
Sanctions Denied
Coburn Optical Indus., v. Cilco, Inc., 610 F. Supp. 656 (M.D.N.C, 1985)
(sanction against plaintiff denied)
Warnings
Reasor v. City of Norfolk, 1985-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 66,368 (E.D. Va. 1984)
(contract)
Atlantic Purchasers v. Aircraft Sales, 101 F.R.D. 779 (W.D.N.C. 1984)
Waller v. Butkovich, 584 F. Supp. 909 (M.D.N.C. 1984) (civil rights)
Phillipp Bros., Inc. v. S.S. Sea-Land Galloway, No. 83-580 (E.D. Va. Feb. 14,
1984)
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CIRCUIT

Sanctions GrantedAgainst Client
Kirksey v. Danks, 608 F. Supp. 1448 (S.D. Miss. 1985) (civil rights; sua
sponte; against defendant)
Parker v. Regan, No. 84-470 (M.D. La. Nov. 7, 1984) (tax; rule 12(b)(6) motion; against plaintiff)
Day v. Amoco Chems. Corp., 595 F. Supp. 1120 (S.D. Tex. 1984), appeal
dismissed, 747 F.2d 1462 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1849 (1985)
(against plaintiff)
Spicer v. United States, 54 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) 84-5444 (W.D. Tex. 1984)
(tax; sua sponte; against plaintiff)
Meyers v. United States, 54 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) 84-5350 (M.D. La. 1984)
(tax; sua sponte; against plaintiff)
Harris v. United States, 84-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCII) V 9900 (S.D. Tex. 1984)
(tax; rule 12(b)(6) motion; against plaintiff)
Against Attorney
Woodfork v. Gavin, 105 F.R.D. 100 (N.D. Miss. 1985) (against plaintiff)
Against Both
Bookkeepers Tax Servs. v. National Cash Register Co., 598 F. Supp. 336
(E.D. Tex. 1984) (contract; rule 12(b)(6) motion; against plaintiff)
Sanctions Denied
Pogo Producing Co. v. Southern Natural Gas Co., 599 F. Supp. 720 (W.D.
La. 1984) (contract; sanction against defendant denied)
Other
Touchstone v. G.B.Q. Corp., 596 F. Supp. 805 (E.D. La. 1984) (rule 56 motion; order to show cause against plaintiff)
SIXTH CIRCUIT

Sanctions GrantedAgainst Attorney
McQueen v. United Paperworkers Int'l Union Local 1967, No. C-1-84-1196
(S.D. Ohio Feb. 26, 1985) (against plaintiff)
Kuzmins v. Employee Transfer Corp., 587 F. Supp. 536 (N.D. Ohio 1984)
(civil rights; against plaintiff)
Barton v. Williams, No. 83-4425 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 17, 1983) (sua sponte;
against plaintiff)
Against Both
Mohammed v. Union Carbide Corp., 1 Fed. R. Serv. 3d (Callaghan) 507 (E.D.
Mich. 1985) (contract; rule 56 motion; against plaintiff)
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Sanctions Denied
Whitesel Family Estate v. United States, 84-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9890
(S.D. Ohio 1984) (tax; rule 56 motion; sanction against plaintiff denied)
McCarthy v. KFC Corp., 607 F. Supp. 343 (W.D. Ky. 1985) (rule 12(b)(6)
motion; sanction against plaintiff denied)
Warnings
In re Consumers Power Co. Sec. Litig., 105 F.R.D. 583 (E.D. Mich. 1985)
(securities)
Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n, Local Union No. 292 v. Wer-Coy
Fabrication Co., 578 F. Supp. 296 (E.D. Mich. 1984)
SEVENTH CIRCUIT

Sanctions GrantedAgainst Client
Peth v. Breitzmann, 611 F. Supp. 50 (E.D. Wis. 1985) (tax; rule 12(b)(6) motion; against plaintiff)
Eske v. Hynes, 601 F. Supp. 142 (E.D. Wis. 1985) (tax; rule 12(b)(6) motion;
against plaintiff)
Ridley v. Goldman, No. 84-C-4580 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 23, 1984) (civil rights; sua
sponte; against plaintiff)
Synder v. IRS, 596 F. Supp. 240 (N.D. Ind. 1984) (tax; rule 56 motion; against
plaintiff)
Cameron v. IRS, 593 F. Supp. 1540 (N.D. Ind. 1984) (tax; rule 12(b)(6) motion; sua sponte; against plaintiff), aff'd, 773 F.2d 126 (7th Cir. 1985)
Young v. IRS, 40 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 239 (N.D. Ind. 1984) (tax; rule
56 motion; against plaintiff)
Frederick v. Clark, 587 F. Supp. 789 (W.D. Wis. 1984) (tax; rule 12(b)(6)
motion; against plaintiff)
Against Attorney
Cannon v. Loyola Univ., 609 F. Supp. 1010 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (civil rights; rule
12(b)(6) motion; against plaintiff), aff'd, 784 F.2d 777 (7th Cir. 1986)
In re Ronco, Inc., 105 F.R.D. 493 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (sua sponte; sanction of
creditors challenging bankruptcy court decision)
Ring v. R.J. Reynolds Indus., 597 F. Supp. 1277 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (civil rights;
rule 12(b)(6) motion; against plaintiff)
RPS Corp. v. Owens-Coming Fiberglass Corp., 1984-2 Trade Cas. (CCH)
66,268 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (rule 56 motion; against plaintiff)
Mosler v. M/K Ventures Int'l Inc., No. 84-2178 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 20, 1984)
(securities; rule 12(b)(6) motion; against plaintiff), vacated, 103 F.R.D. 385
(N.D. Ill. 1984).
Brownlow v. General Servs. Employees Union, 35 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH)
34,886 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (civil rights; rule 56 motion; against plaintiff)
AM Int'l Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., No. 80-C-4016 (N.D. Ill. June 27, 1984)
(against defendant)
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Rodgers v. Lincoln Towing Serv., No. 83-7038, (N.D. Ill. Mar. 19, 1984) (civil
rights; sua sponte; against plaintiff), aff'd, 771 F.2d 194 (7th Cir. 1985)
Against Both
Fleming Sales Co. v. Bailey, 611 F. Supp. 507 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (contract; rule
56 motion; against plaintiff
Unspecified
Hochalter v. Century 21 Hallmark, Ltd., No. 84-7924, (N.D. Ill. Feb. 13,
1985) (contract; against plaintiff)
Davenport v. Bell, 85-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9193 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (tax; rule
12(b)(6) motion; against plaintiff)
SFM Corp. v. Sundstrand Corp., 102 F.R.D. 555 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (against
plaintiff)
EEOC v. Appleton Elec. Co., 586 F. Supp. 1108 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (civil rights;
rule 56 motion; against defendant)
Best & Co. v. Munch King, Inc., No. 83-5203 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 13, 1983 (contract; against defendant)
SanctionsDenied
Ssab Svenski Stal Aktiebolag v. High Strength Steel, Inc., No. 85-2152 (N.D.
Ill. July 11, 1985) (sanction against plaintiff denied)
International Union of Operating Eng'rs, Local 150 v. Arrow Road Constr.,
No. 84-8639 (N.D. Ill. June 25, 1985) (sanction against defendant denied)
Harris Trust & Say. Bank v. Ellis, 609 F. Supp. 1118 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (securities; sanction against defendant denied)
Coleman v. Frierson, No. 82-4460 (N.D. III. Apr. 30, 1985) (civil rights; sanction against defendant denied)
Doe v. Thomas, 604 F. Supp. 1508 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (rule 56 motion; sanction
against plaintiff denied)
Davis v. United States, 104 F.R.D. 509 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (tax; rule 56 motion;
sanction against plaintiff denied)
Blair v. United States Treasury Dep't, 596 F. Supp. 273 (N.D. Ind. 1984) (tax;
rule 56 motion; sanction against plaintiff denied)
Manarchy, Ltd. v. Figi Giftware, Inc., No. 84-2358 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 5, 1984)
(rule 12(b)(6) motion; sanction against plaintiff denied)
Kittler v. City of Chicago, No. 84-1649 (N.D. Ill. July 30, 1984) (civil rights;
sanction against defendant denied)
McCarthy v. KFC Corp., 35 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 1 34,598 (N.D. Ill.
1984) (civil rights; rule 12(b)(6) motion; sanction against plaintiff denied)
Pudlo v. Director, IRS, 587 F. Supp. 1010 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (tax; sanction
against plaintiff denied)
Donaldson Co. v. Able Design Servs., No. 81-4811 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 13, 1984)
(sanction against defendant denied)
Pieper v. Muslin, No. 83-7155 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 21, 1984) (sanction against
plaintiff denied)
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Thompson v. Midland Prods. Co., No. 83-7469 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 20, 1984) (civil
rights; rule 56 motion; sanction against plaintiff denied)
Perta v. Comprehensive Serv. Co., No. 83-5518 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 30, 1983) (rule
12(b)(6) motion; sanction against plaintiff denied)
Warnings
Northern Trust Co. v. E.T. Clancy Export Corp., 612 F. Supp. 712 (N.D. Ill.
1985)
Selsor v. Callaghan & Co., 609 F. Supp. 1003 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (civil rights)
Cashco Oil Co. v. Moses, 605 F. Supp. 70 (N.D. Ill. 1985)
Miller v. Affiliated Fin. Corp., 600 F. Supp. 997 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (securities)
Gawron v. Sargent & Lundy Eng'g Co., No. 84-6032 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 31, 1984)
(civil rights)
Tutera v. City of McHenry, No. 84-1910 (N.D. InI. July 27, 1984) (civil rights)
Ileka v. Anco Medical Reagents, No. 84-1331 (N.D. Ill. July 20, 1984)
(securities)
Jaffe v. Federal Reserve Bank, 586 F. Supp. 106 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (civil fights)
Giacomino Constr. Co. v. National Bonding & Accident Ins. Co., No. 84-1478
(N.D. Ill. May 10, 1984) (contract)
Pete Thoesen Tractor & Equip. Repair Co. v. City of Chicago, No. 83-8549
(N.D. Ill. Apr. 27, 1984)
In re Continental Sec. Litig., No. 82-4712 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 9, 1984) (securities)
Powerama Distrib. Corp. v. Atlantic Richfield Co., No. 82-5688 (N.D. Ill.
Mar. 28, 1984)
Old Tyme Enters. v. Bajaj Am., Inc., No. 83-7923 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 21, 1984)
(contract)
Lancaster v. Thompson, No. 82-5548 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 15, 1983) (civil rights)
Brown v. Federation of State Medical Bds., No. 82-7398 (N.D. Inl. Nov. 10,
1983)
Cooling Tower Erectors, Inc. v. Williams, No. 81-6678 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 3,
1983)
Kelly v. United States Postal Serv., No. 83-993 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 20, 1983)
Other
Turner v. U.S., 84-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH)
tion for sanctions invited)

9805 (S.D. Ind. 1984) (tax; mo-

EIGHTH CIRCUIT

Sanctions Granted Against Client
Miller v. United States, 604 F. Supp. 804 (E.D. Mo. 1985) (tax; rule 56 motion; against plaintiff)
Valle v. Taylor, 587 F. Supp. 514 (D.N.D. 1984) (civil rights; sua sponte;
against plaintiff)
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Against Attorney
Van Berkel v. Fox Farm & Rd. Mach., 581 F. Supp. 1248 (D. Minn. 1984)
(rule 56 motion; against plaintiff)
Against Both
Fisher v. CPC Int'l, Inc., 591 F. Supp. 228 (W.D. Mo. 1984) (civil rights; rule
56 motion; against plaintiff)
Lucha, Inc. v. Goeglein, 575 F. Supp. 785 (E.D. Mo. 1983) (contract; against
defendant)
Sanctions Denied
St. Jude Medical, Inc. v. Intermedics, Inc., 623 F. Supp. 1294 (D. Minn. 1985)
(sanction against defendant denied)
Rauenhorst v. United States, 104 F.R.D. 588 (D. Minn. 1985) (rule 56 motion; sanction against plaintiff denied)
Bigalk v. Federal Land Bank Ass'n, 107 F.R.D. 210 (D. Minn. 1985) (rule 56
motion; sanction against plaintiff denied)
United States v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., 1984-2 Trade Cas. (CC-) 1
66,094 (S.D. Iowa 1984) (sanction against defendant denied)
Other
Hasty v. Paccar, Inc., 583 F. Supp. 1577 (E.D. Mo. 1984) (motion for sanctions invited)
NINTH CIRCUIT

Sanctions GrantedAgainst Client
Felix v. Arizona Dep't of Health Servs., 606 F. Supp. 634 (D. Ariz. 1985)
(against plaintiff)
Heimbaugh v. City & County of San Francisco, 591 F. Supp. 1573 (N.D. Cal.
1984) (civil rights; rule 56 motion; against plaintiff)
Against Attorney
Hudson v. Moore Business Forms, Inc., 609 F. Supp. 467 (N.D. Cal. 1985)
(civil rights; sua sponte; against defendant)
Kendrick v. Zanides, 609 F. Supp. 1162 (N.D. Cal. 1985) (civil rights; rule
12(b)(6) and 56 motions; against plaintiff)
United Food & Commercial Workers Union Local No. 115 v. Armour & Co.,
106 F.R.D. 345 (N.D. Cal. 1985) (against plaintiff)
In re Itel Sec. Litig., 596 F. Supp. 226 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (securities; against
defendant), aff'd, 791 F.2d 262 (9th Cir. 1986)
Golden Eagle Distrib. Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 103 F.R.D. 124 (N.D. Cal.
1984) (contract; sua sponte; against defendant), rev'd, No. 84-2602 (9th Cir. Oct.
9, 1986)
Blake v. National Casualty Co., 607 F. Supp. 189 (C.D. Cal. 1984) (against
plaintiff)
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Smith v. United Trans. Union Local No. 81, 594 F. Supp. 96 (S.D. Cal. 1984)
(civil rights; sua sponte; against defendant)
Larkin v. Heckler, 584 F. Supp. 512 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (sua sponte; against
defendant)
Allen v. Faragasso, 585 F. Supp. 1114 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (sua sponte; against
plaintiff)
Huettig & Schromm, Inc. v. Landscape Contractors Council of N. Cal., 582 F.
Supp. 1519 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (rule 12(b)(6) motion; against plaintiff)
Against Both
WSB Elec. Co. v. Rank & File Comm. to Stop the 2-Gate Sys., 103 F.R.D.
417 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (civil rights; rule 12(b)(6) motion; against plaintiff)
Zaldivar v. City of Los Angeles, 590 F. Supp. 852 (C.D. Cal. 1984) (rule 56
motion; against plaintiff), rev'd, 780 F.2d 823 (9th Cir. 1986)
Sanctions Denied
Micros Sys., Inc. v. Portland Cash Register Sys., 1985-1 Trade Cas. (CCH)
66,353 (D. Or. 1984) (contract; sanction against defendant denied)
John S. Griffith Constr. Co. v. Southern Cal. Cement Masons Negotiating
Comm., 607 F. Supp. 809 (C.D. Cal. 1984) (sanction against defendant denied)
Laborers Health & Welfare Trust Fund v. Hess, 594 F. Supp. 273 (N.D. Cal.
1984) (rule 56 motion; sanction against plaintiff denied)
In re Morrell, 42 Bankr. 973 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (sanction against plaintiff
denied)
Other
Aune v. United States, 582 F. Supp. 1132 (D. Ariz. 1984), aff'd mem., 765
F.2d 148 (9th Cir. 1985) (tax; sua sponte; order to show causo against plaintiff)
TENTH CIRCUIT

Sanctions GrantedAgainst Attorney
Weir v. Lehman Newspapers, 105 F.R.D. 574 (D. Colo. 1985) (against
plaintiff)
Wold v. Minerals Eng'g Co., 575 F. Supp. 166 (D. Colo. 1983) (against
plaintiff)
Sanctions Denied
Robinson v. C.R. Laurence Co., 105 F.R.D. 567 (D. Colo. 1985) (rule 12(b)(6)
motion; sanction of plaintiff denied)
Hizel & Sons, Inc. v. Browning-Ferris Indus., 600 F. Supp. 161 (D. Colo.
1985) (sanction against defendant denied)
Warnings
Saine v. A.I.A., Inc., 582 F. Supp. 1299 (D. Colo. 1984)
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ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

Sanctions GrantedAgainst Client
Sunn v. Dean, 597 F. Supp. 79 (N.D. Ga. 1984) (civil rights; rule 12(b)(6)
motion; against plaintiff)
Against Attorney
Donaldson v. Clark, 105 F.R.D. 526 (M.D. Ga. 1985) (civil rights; sua sponte;
against plaintiff), rev'd, 786 F.2d 1570, reh'g granted and opinion vacated, 794
F.2d 572 (11th Cir. 1986)
McLaughlin v. Western Casualty & Sur. Co., 603 F. Supp. 978 (S.D. Ala.
1985) (against defendant)
Against both
Florida Monument Builders v. All Faiths Memorial Gardens, 605 F. Supp.
1324 (S.D. Fla. 1984) (sua sponte and on defendant's motion; against plaintiff)
Glover v. Libman, 578 F. Supp. 748 (N.D. Ga. 1983) (securities; sua sponte;
against one plaintiff for vexatious motion to disqualify counsel for another
plaintiff)
Sanctions Denied
Sikes v. Rubin Law Offices, 102 F.R.D. 259 (N.D. Ga. 1984) (rule 12(b)(6)
motion; sanction against plaintiff denied)
Gresham v. Waffle House, Inc., 586 F. Supp. 1442 (N.D. Ga. 1984) (civil
rights; rule 12(b)(6) motion; sanction against plaintiff denied)
Other
Taylor v. Bear Stearns & Co., 572 F. Supp. 667 (N.D. Ga. 1983) (securities;
motion for sanctions invited)
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Sanctions Granted Against Client
McLaughlin v. Bradlee, 602 F. Supp. 1412 (D.D.C. 1985) (civil rights; sua
sponte; against plaintiff)
Johnson v. Secretary, Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 587 F. Supp. 1117
(D.D.C. 1984) (sua sponte; against defendant)
Against Attorney
Weisman v. Rivlin, 598 F. Supp. 724 (D.D.C. 1984) (against plaintiff)
Sanctions Denied
McLaughlin v. Bradlee, 599 F. Supp. 839 (D.D.C. 1984) (civil rights; rule
12(b)(6) motion; sanction against plaintiff denied)
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Other
Hughes v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 33 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
648 (D.D.C. 1983) (civil rights; motion for sanctions invited)
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APPENDIX 13
Court of Appeals Cases, by Circuit

Aug. 1, 1983-Nov. 1, 1985
FIRST CIRCUIT

Blanchette v. Cataldo, 734 F.2d 869 (1st Cir. 1984) (contract; defendant's rule
11 violations in district court did not constitute abuse of process)
SECOND CIRCUIT

Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 762 F.2d 243 (2nd Cir. 1985)
(civil rights; affirming summary judgment, reversing denial of sanctions)
Lane v. Sotheby Parke Bernet, Inc., 758 F.2d 71 (2nd Cir. 1985) (civil rights;
affirming summary judgment; remanded for findings whether plaintiff, who
pleaded nonfrivolous course of action, should have continued action after completing discovery)
Tedeschi v. Barney, 757 F.2d 465 (2nd Cir.) (affirming sanctions), cert. denied,
106 S. Ct. 147 (1985)
Goldman v. Belden, 754 F.2d 1059 (2nd Cir. 1985) (securities; reversing rule
12(b)(6) dismissal and sanctions)
Envirotech Corp. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 729 F.2d 70 (2nd Cir. 1984) (contract; court notes availability of rule 11 sanctions)
FOURTH CIRCUIT

Chu v. Griffith, 771 F.2d 79 (4th Cir. 1985) (civil rights; affirming sanctions)
Nelson v. Piedmont Aviation, 750 F.2d 1234 (4th Cir. 1984) (affirming denial
of sanctions), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 235& (1985)
FIFTH CIRCUIT

Choo v. Exxon Corp., 764 F.2d 1148 (5th Cir. 1985) (vacating sanctions)
Cates v. International Tel. & Tel., 756 F.2d 1161 (5th Cir. 1985) (warning for
pre-amendment filing)
Elliott v. Perez, 751 F.2d 1472 (5th Cir. 1985) (civil rights; remanded for consideration of compliance with rule 11)
Warren v. Reserve Fund, 728 F.2d 741 (5th Cir. 1984) (securities; affirming
denial of sanctions)
SIXTI CIRCUIT

Thorpe v. United States, No. 85-5403 (6th Cir. Aug. 29, 1985) (tax; affirming
sanctions)
SEVENTH CIRCUIT

Frazier v. Cast, 771 F.2d 259 (7th Cir. 1985) (civil rights; affirming sanctions)
Rodgers v. Lincoln Towing Serv., 771 F.2d 194 (7th Cir. 1985) (civil rights;
affirming sanctions)
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Mark v. Furay, 769 F.2d 1266 (7th Cir. 1985) (civil rights; court notes availability of rule 11 sanctions)
Steinle v. Warren, 765 F.2d 95 (7th Cir. 1985) (civil rights; affirming
sanctions)
Lepucki v. Van Wormer, 765 F.2d 86 (7th Cir. April 4, 1985) (tax; affirming
sanctions)
EIGHTH CIRCUIT

Purnell v. Missouri Dep't of Corrections, 753 F.2d 703 (8th Cir. 1985) (consequences of signature on pleading)
TENTH CIRCUIT

Chevron, U.S.A. v. Hand, 763 F.2d 1184 (10th Cir. 1985) (affirming
sanctions)
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

Fitzgerald v. Seaboard Sys. R.R., 760 F.2d 1249 (11th Cir. 1985) (contract;
warning)
Williams v. Greyhound Lines, 756 F.2d 818 (11th Cir. 1985) (affirming denial
of sanctions)
Friedlander v. Nims, 755 F.2d 810 (11th Cir. 1985) (securities; warning)
Thiem v. Hertz Corp., 732 F.2d 1559 (11th Cir. 1984) (contract; court notes
signature requirement of rule 11 in taking jurisdiction though appellant's counsel
didn't sign appeal notice)
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Westmoreland v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 770 F.2d 1168 (D.C. Cir. 1985)
(reversing denial of sanctions)
FEDERAL CIRCUIT

In re Oximetrix, 748 F.2d 637 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (contract; granting sanctions)
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